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SPEECH CATEGORIZATION AND THE
LIMITS OF FIRST AMENDMENT
FORMALISM:
LESSONS FROM NIKE v. KA
INIRODVUCiON
A famous drawing, waggishly entitled "My Wife and My
Motherin-Law" can be perceived as depicting eilher a coquettish
you ng woman or an ugly old hag) Nike's allegedly false and mis-
leading statements about working conditions in its overseas facto-
ries2 present the conceptual equivalent of this picture: Viewed
\ meli a 0. Lewis Pro6fessor of Con suionai Lassi 4nr.fzona Ste tin ive rsiiy College oti
fawir am gratetu! to amry 'leander; Ed Bakeri Ronald IDxorkin.ihu ela..efs
Mur phy, im Nickel, Robert Post. rd Schauer, and David Vadek f tr heir h elp ul comtaments
and suggestiois and to Paul tIxIelar.I!nd Chris Sandor, and Adm IiaffTd Iheir reeach assI
tance. .ei{a~miid~a
Io disusio of t is drain fe Illus11 on Woks J .1 C. Vrpta AubiuiJhtp; /psyl x psehi t -dresden de/ ! Law dix ers[%P I Materiaf www x.l uio o rks cn tm l, perceptua~imbigmity html ,!997).
2 In response t c harges bY human r:ight ganizatio labor gr io up and newspapi d-
toir iasttit mistreat~ed workers sinits oxereas ftonesr Nik~e defenided it l abo r praci e s i n
ment isrib~tcd foir public rclatiins purpo0ses g;;ee Kasky x.Nikc Inc. 45 Pi3d24 3, 2 48 (P al.
2002) Ilnvoking I Caifrni a's fal se adve rtisin g a nd u nfair comipet itio6n l axxs. M ark Kasky sued
Nike in ( alifo a supllio ourt alleging that the following statemits made by Nilce in these
publi eoimmuricat oim ae efalsei aieidiig:
aceordance with appicaible loal ass s and regul at ions governing xx ages andhours
iht tiey arce paid oi aver1 age dou t*he applicable local minimu [ rwage tha they
lorking conilittnsarei cmpliane with applcCable l cal [ as and rega I tio nsgox erning occu ip ationa aheat and~ m safety'
Id.
Ilic serSP ior cos*irt di!smi s sed thc¢ coma!!iitwithot i[eaxe to 0amed d £ .at 24 8- 49 1 ie
Ca i fomNii,a urt of A ppea l affirme d the disgm isgsal on iF irst Amienidm~ent g rou lnds. [4at 2 4 9 seei
Kas s.~ Nike, . 93Cal. Rprr. 2d 8 54 (Cal. Ct. \pp. 200(. '\ dixtdedci Caliornia supreme(Our reesd 4a~t 451-1t2 6,adNkextgx esuitte ntdSae t e
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from one perspective, these statements appear to be commercial
specch, while looked at from another angle, they secm to part of a
public debate on a matter ofpublic concern. cogniin this am-
biguity, Uniied States Supremee CoUrt Justice Stephen Breyer ex-
claimed during Oral argument: [Tl he truth of the lmatter is think
it's both. T ey're both tring to sel their poduct and theyre try-
ing t make a statement that's relevant to a public debate,"t
Responding ila way typical of lower courts faced with hard
free speech cases, the Ca!lfornia Supreme C ourt in an opinion by
Justice Joyce Ke nn attempted to extract a verbl aformula from
relevant United States Supreme Court preee that uld deter-
mine the proper classification of the speech in question.4  Under
the formula s divilned, the majority Concluded that Nike's alleg-
edly false or misleading statements were properly catcgorized as
co mmercial speech. and thus were entitled to no Fir st Amendment
protection.6  Similarly purporting to rely on Supreme Court pr €e-
dent, but reaching the opposite concusion, Justice Janice Brown
found that Nike's speech w as -more like" non-commercial speech
than commnrcial speech,7 and thus concluded Nike's speech was
Comurt P""! grntn e" and hearin argument the Wned NtAM Supre metor dsmissd
the w nti of emrani r a impro! idently grante~d. apparentls o n yurisdi ytional grundhs. N ike. !Inc
. KaSky,1 sc S. Ct. 2255 (200 3)
STr. of Orlal Airguments at 55859. Nike,! 12 5. (t. 2554 (2003) )(N 002 575), a uai be at
hItp. www upre m ecti uso oral argumnts/argument rancripts,02-57S pd See n/so
Nile, 1 23 .Ct at 2565i (Brtever; J. dissenting) (characeir zin g Nike' co0 mmuica tions as itt-
vol ving "'a i xttI of 6"ommercial and nonco rI (p - Jubic-I, sue-otIented) e emInIts)I: l at
2558 (Stevens, J. ennurting)("[ The spec at issu rep re SentiS a Vlendi of mmeial
sp eech. no neomerueial spe ech and debat e o~nan is gu e o f p u b lie importanc e.":)
aAccoi'ding to Ju stice Knar
.A close readng of the high ou rts comercM~ial speech decisionsg suggests {ttit is
poissible to for mul ate a! lm i ted-pu rpos tett distiguis com merceial from non-
commriitii! al speeh e eonc " htde. thei ; F refre thiat wh eti a coutirt mu ast deci de w het he
pai ! iiuar spe ch may. he subj ect to Ia sg. aimred at preveninig f'alse adyeni sing tir
other t hritis of cieicicial dc eption ciategori z ing a paricular statc me nt as coiti-
mercia or noncoedi rcial speec requtres cotsideratin ofthree elemetis:th
Keslt, 45 P.:3dat 256 (emphasis remoed
fri ldat259 (IB eau se in the sta te ments at is sue he re Ni ke w as act in as a coimme rcial
spaker, hecau.se it s! itended a udatei was priimariy thc bstycrs0 ! of i prodts an d hecaus the!
state ments co n sisted o f fa ctu al r epreentation about *is ow n busns opS e 0ratioins. we co0nclu de
tha th est atetnietit were c oni hercial speec i kbr purp oses o f applyin sgt at e laWsdesgigned to
pr event false adv ertising and ot her fo rts of co mmer cial de ce ption"
frd. at 261 ( iC]o m mercial speeh thatiS tllse ori m isleaiding r~eceiv es nit protectio ui0n-
der the !i i Amen~idmenti and there fore a! law that proiblits onily schi unprotected spec can-
not viiilat consvionial free speech provisions ).
'at 209. 274 (Biow, J., d[i sseninig)[ Atho'agh believin~g that sueh an "all-or-noth ing
approach" wa r * equired by Sureme0 (un precedent Jusi ce B~os noted that !i would h e
prfrbei wh onseiie to develop! "a more ntiaiied in qu iry'ihai acounts fur the te aliti es t if
today's commercial worl i at 279 (Bi' . J. idissenting).Specifi cal' sh sui iggested iliat
t heC ( iit could develop an int etmediat~e caxtegoriy ip rotecoted sp e ec hwh ere co6m mercial land
noncotumiinericial cl eets ar e closely intert wine d" w hic h wou ld rece-ive eretet rp rotect~ion thin
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entitled to rig0rous First Amendment protection., Prominently
missing from both opinion', however, is any serious examination
of the underlying i al ues served by the First Amelndrment's protec-
tion of spedeh.
In a typical free speech case, such use of verbal formu ae or
case matching to determine the category in whih to place the
speech in qusion works well enough. There is often precedent so
factually sirmilar hat it really is controlling; or even in the absence
of such truly coitrolling precedent, categorizing the speech in
ques tion one way rather than the other so clearly promotes the val-ies undelyi1g resespeech d octrine that a judge can intuitively
make he right choice. But in a case Such as this, where there is no
case directly on point and the intuition of informed observers is
pulled equaly in both directions, any attempt to derive the answer
through such verbal formulae or case matching is at best futile, and
at worst a cover for a decision based on some irrelevant or even
som illegitimate consideration For, as Ronald Dworkin (para-
phrasing Kant) has aptly explained: -analogy without theory is
blind."
Iln this article, I will attempt to fill the lacuna left by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court by focusing on preci sely what fre speech
values are implicated by the application of California's false ad-
verising regimei" to Nike's speech. To this end, I will first de-
scrbe the overall structure of American fre speech doctrine and
then suggest what values best explain this structure. I will next
inquire to what extent the application o f Calilforiia's legal regile
oeci!!al speec uti les p rotet ioni than nonco0mme~rcial spech. £Id See Robert M. ON ed.
Nike~~~~~~~~ s, .ak Rut3gi ae e. 4 (ME W.' Rl . L. RV 129 (204)(sgstn
suh an intem ed ate cat go ). Such a 'n u and in qUiry" uld i ndee he moe fi th to pro.duc# a correct re sult ina hard case like tis. particual Yif it led the cot to paN care ful alieni
Ju stc Brown's desir o ticl oe United State Supr~eme Court do ctr~ine even wheni
i s cointr~aryto her vi ews ts comnable. It is nt at all cle ar ho tw ever that such a ' nu an ed
i nqu-iry an d the de velopment iof fan :inte rmeidi ate categor>' a, ould t hav bee n co iiaay to Si-
pretwe Co urt pr~eecdent ot othcrwSte an approach itwpr or ia[ lowere court to have adtpted
SRon~ald DuorkiinnPri'oTeo,29\t.S.I.3337(l7. Dworkin
0 ntinhle.
A*n anialogy is a way of stating a conclusion not a w+ay of r~each~ing one{ and theory
mnust do the real wsors.Is bu ring you otto0w fl ag mo re like agk i ng a speech on
H yde Park Cor or a i s suting peo ple wa ot ffen~sie in~sults ? Is aborion0i mor like
infanicide ori apendectm We cannot even bgint answer hose questions
ioi a deep ex ped i tio n into0 theory.
NI.at 7P1 72.
Ihro ughout l this ortice I use the ieim t7lse advertising regi o ij 1 nclude both (ali-
fornia's talse advertiig law proper. (-t Bt'S & Pitot . ( itii 17500 (West 2 o00 a wellas
is tinfair competitin law, 17200, wich al"o proi bis unfirI eceptive, untme iw slead
iiCg advertis inig. i t . B S& Pii (no § I7200 (West 000).
my20i)]
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thlreatenls these nlormls. WeC will then be in a position to determuine
the appropriate level of F irm Amendment protection for Nike's
speech.
I. FREE S LC . DE IORA , AND N:B1R DISCOUIR sE1
To sensibly apply any legal doctrine, one needs a irm under-
standing of its purpose and underlying values. This is particularly
tre in no l cases such as thi in whcO h established doctrine sup-
plies no mechanical answer Unfortunately the United States Su-
preme Court has done a poor job of explicating the purpose and
underlying values of free speech doctrine. Consequently as the
Cai fornia Supreme COurt did in this cas e l0wer cou rts Often
thraSh about aimulessl trying to find guidringprinciples in novel
free speech cases.
N the t pical free speech case there is no necess"ity, to appeal
to first principles in order to reach SOund resul As JIdge
Learned Hand long ago wisely admonished, free speech doctrine
should be built on rules that are -hard. onvmntional, difficult to
evade.~ Inl the [Last thirty- years, the SupremeC Court hlas' followed
this advice and constructed a forvmaistic free speech doctrine that
is often capable of mechanically supplyin correct answers as
measured by these uiderlying values. It has dOne this primlariily by
devising a tw-track system under which "content-based" restric-
tions are eXtr emely sWspect and rarely survive constitutional chal-
le nge, while coMntent-neutral ltaws are preSUmptively consti tu-
tional and are rarely invalidated) ' As we shall see, however, al-
thougLh this system wo rks well enough in rn-of-the-milH cases, it
is ionetheless built on an illusion. For there is in fact no geneal
rle againm content disc riinnation, and sometiies co nt!nt-neutral
laws are invalidated beCause they are inimical to basic free Speech
normis.
I wanti to emphasize at the outset that my ainalysis here is pri-
mlan!lY descriptive. I will offer what I believe to be the bst exPa-
L atr lier sions of t tis descri pnon olfthe stret ure and values o1t \mneaetn 're e speech
Ca iipaignFinicc li J am wie W insteiti IDaliaa l'roaecro ic}and the Fai st 4,nnd~nenr 28 U
ri AX IoN 1 . RI V.X~ 30 5, 314 2 8{ p2 02 )[herema~te r I~a tabas epcot Ps.iat ian] see also J ame s
Weinstein, -tie Speet 6. 1, elintii Neutr~aliity andi the {Imeicia~it o pt at Diaev.i+ii in}
"III Bot: NO5A RII. itiS FR IIX)M4i C 1-\PRi \SI]ON & OR.EIRI SASS R( CAN DIM NOCR AC "V 146 17
5 2 (Thomna s 1 tans!e ed., 2 0 0!)
:}L este fro6m Learnaed H!anad to zechanr ah (Ch alee Jr. (J:an 8. 1 20) riiepraed inGrald
this'ori 275rAN. . RLv. 719. 770 (1975)
-- ee-- infra--- no-- s-- 4- 46 and accom panying text-----------------------------------------------------
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nation of American free speech doctrine as it is, not what it Should
be. Wh atover might be sid in favor of a free spech system that is
primarily in ser ice of a diverse marketplace of ideas or a broad
colnceptionl of ind ividual liberty, neither of these alue S is the best
explanation of the basic normunde rlying American free speech
doctrine as it now stands. Rathe as shal see, the peculiar pat-
tern of American Nfree speech doctrine, under which some speec is
highly protected while other speech may be freely regulated, is
best explained as sering the core democratic precept hat, in deal-
ing with us in our capacities as the ultimate governors of' society,government must treat us as equal and rational agents.
A. ITle Basic Struictu1re of"Imericaln Free SpeCh(/ Duocime
ad the Protectio (of Pbie Discorse
Te leitmoti of cnempo y free speech doctrine is is hos-
tilitY to content discrimination, especially view point discriminla-
tion, which the Supreme Cour has condemned as the most "egLre
gious" orm of content discrimination' Viewpoint discriminatory
regulations are thosethat t arget "the specific motivating ideology
Or the opinion or the perspective of the speaker." An example of
such a regulation wOuId be one that forbad anyonle from saying
that abortion wa s murder or that blacks are inherently inferior to
whites.
This strong prot ection against content regulation, however,
does not apply across the board to all human utterances in what-
eVer cOte they may occur To begin with, there are familiar con-
tent-based exceptions to Firt Amendment protection, including
"fighting words"" (e., face to ace insults) obscenity, child por-
nographyj and threatOs) It is often mistakenly believed that if
expression does not fall into suCI a traditionally unprotected Cate-
gory of speech, governmnent is fo rbidden from regulati ngth COn-
tent of the speech in question absent a compelling r ason., This is
SRoisentberiger' vRec tor{ &. itlor of iithe Un. of;i Va. 55 sU.S. 819. 8 2 9 95)  For
JAMES \vEiNs |N. ihAT E SPEECII PORNOGRAPHI-, AND T1I- RAP.D)ICAL ATTACK ON FP-EESi,, Ii &(X \]'It i, ii IlI\3 o , \ 1 i9 15 9 )i I Io
noscober'i, 1 \ :I.S a 5 829.( haplinSky s." New, l-!ampshitne, 3! 5U.S s568. 572 (1942).
Mii ler. Calif rni a.41 U IS 5 (1973)
7 5 , 705 ( I969).
e g Ricer Pa adn t nter (ne 940F. Supp 83 4 1IMd 199 ) i I R(DNm
SM A I I iANI) NitMltR NFI E Di (VIF S1iII Az! :1 \f F' th )e str tt i "tiP] y st
I n the dft1 standai d OI r m easur i the cotttent-hasedrteguat 1 ii !speech. Fhts means that t
cases in wht tiieiist is re gulatedon the b asi's of" content, the strict scruin y test w~ill apply
wall
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demonstrably not the case. Rather as Robert Pos has persua-
siely argued, the vitually absolute protection against content-
based discrimination applies only within the do main of 'public
discourse that is, to expression on matters of public concern in
settings dedicated or esential to democratic selfIgovernance such
as hoks, magazines. films, the Internet, Or in public forMms "uch
as the speaker' corne ofthe park. It is in this realm that the peo-
ple, the ultimate source of political authority in a democracy. can
freely examine and discuss the rules, norms, and conditions that
constitue society.
Within this realm, every proposition is open to question. For
if government were allowed to manage the content of this discus-
sin, eithe by excluding certain ideas as wrong or offlensive, or
even by se ting e agena, e opinion formed by public discus-
sion would not reflect tie independent wfll of the people, but
would rather reflect the preferences of those temporarily entrusted
to govern society. 2  In this realm, even the most minimal of civil-
ity norms may not be entorced for fear that such regulation Will
inevitably reflect cultural or poiical norms of some par-ticular
community, wten it is these very norms that ar up for question 3
In addition, a spea er must be allowed to use wOrdS Or symolIs Of
the speaker's choosing. even highly inflammatory ones, lest the
resolution of specific controversies, as Nwel as the entire democ-
ratic process, seem illegitimate to that speaker.' 4
However, precisely because public discourse i the Ihited
States is so strongly protected, the realin dedicated to such expres-
sion cannot be conceived as covering the entire expanse of human
expression,2  Just as it is imperative in a democracy to have a
unles dtiyplced by 'ome milte iist ,'mend met san dard *7 (footnote oni t ,I c)
S'ee RObert C Post h 7o*, V C II fo ns irr mc p I r lPhin. Dscf fw's) O- n llo l 1 1
X I n h t g I I I I 5 60, 604(1990).
\ lames Mad isaon elaredin the Repot rite 'Vigini Resolutions 189 de
nounineS "eseA i & Sedition t hpople. not hegovernLme pos sthew 0 t bo lut e
soeegt.'l e .I lose Co55 f s.)O Sn ll i ' .. p4 7 1l4)(u tin 4Eliot's
batso o10he FederlCst tt iono 56d 1170 (1876)).
] se I Ru (.P.I l C (JoN Ui s D1C AiiS DE'st tthA (aOndtLNET, MA NAGE \nit 130 (199)
Se e R obert F ost R ec'itg iw n w id Iltkl poire n f st s Amet 111r rilden m,
88 C i. . 2l (2000 (:h ntn a s nithin particular
ccum istances, serve as a vehicle for the construction of demrocratic legnimacy." )
T 7he Co ur*t's cat egoi{c ale ealussio of ~certainr typ es of spe ech Ironm First Amle ndmne nt
prot etion c an be seen as a it a ttempt to dr as a lin e bet ween p ublic d i scotirSe and other type s of5
pech. such as threats fightin g wfords. obsceitiY and child porn graphy that have little or noi
connecio{n sitit dentocranesell-gosvernance hiee (2haplinSlkv s.N ew llainp gtire. 15 i US. i S,
572I"+ ii haeen well observed that such utterances are no essenitial part of any expo sition of
ida and are ollsuch sligtl socia ,fl e as a step t tit that an1 benefi ,ha ,may be derivied
foi thetii is cl earl 'otsvighte b die  !al itst in ordet and) mrality.")
[ \ () 1, 5 4: 4
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realm in which any idea can be questioned as vituperatively as the
speaker choose, there must bhe other domains in which govern-
ment may efficiently carry out th reSults yielded by the democ-
ratic process. Thus, in set.tinugs dedicated to some purpose other
than public discourse, such as those dedic ated to effectuating gov-
erninent programs in the government workplac, instruction in a
public school classroom,2 ' or the administration of justice in the
co u rtroom government has far greater Ice ay to regulate the
content of speech.2
Some have argued tHt te settings in which governmen may
regulate the content of speech are confined to those in whilc the
government is acting as a proprietor or educator, rather thatn in its
So" ereign capactyi Contrary to this iiew. the occasions in Which
the goernment, actinig as sovereign, regulates the content of
See onruck Myer. 461i 1. Si38h 147 (i983)(wiinug ihat thle dischar~ge of assistant
See B hel Sh Dis. 10 1-" 478" U. 75,65(96 r~cigafis mnmn
challenge by astudentiisu spended for uingi oiiffensively lew ,miid indecen speech a a high
School alssembl nnell v ren,'o1 24 F 3d 800 820-21 (6th (i 2001) (ccludig thIt a
umversiisy Ins rctors ssion for using protane languagei class did n ot violate th i st
Minendinen), a i  v. I a1, is'a 805 1 58, i 865 fh5 ir. I9853 (ieJecting a i t sA, m endment
challenge;y a1 uiyeryiItrutor isharged for pi steIn usl of pro fanit 1in: t cl a ssroo)
Jackson) v Ba ix, 605in AliI2d l3S 13 ((na 92 (upolin a contemp convgic
t agit the prt y ! I sing pfi th e cor t roo Ith d 1) iaBa 1 as n 675
S(d :I05, 06F.9)uoi th9dscpl ine of attone ,I orl2 b ig pnia i i a tele-
phonel conversation is ith a udiIa sIstn) Itt 1'. \igal 63 NW.Id ll 15 (M\I In n.
( t. \pp;. 2001 ) (upodin a I 1 co;anp covcto agis di part Ioim profaI in the
c,,tolIom) 11 argtII I v. [em iesI t'l Co. 23 .3 42, 346 ([1n lt ,App 20M0(1) (uph l~ d Ing,-
GetLe v. Stt Ba, 50(t 1US 1030 107 (91( I t is u; )c7tionil , thati thecortooits elf i'inr g a j ud icialipro eedNing wha e vei right to ' fr~e spe ech'i ant attorne y ha is is exiemnely
,rcImsehibed.") /al a S tepp:, 968 1 2 92 928 (9tir 1 992) (reJecting the ir A me Oned-
ment cheallentge by an attoiirneyi delendtng anti-abonrio n prtesrrs.iS w{ho were held i co ntemrpt
for violatin~g a court{ order prohibifting the atto}rtiev from uintg or*ds such' as 'baby killer" lin~ked
to clud ed defenses: the oud r stat, "[ulrtg a trial.! lawyers uust speak .a . wit I rele{ance
aid maoderion"iif), in iv i.. 639 A2d 603. 6506 n.5 (D)C 94 rcgiiigta saecut
hae umlyedta utSeI of o lagu age in o ur i~, byitsel gr"ounds to col mpt");
ci/tenh 403 U.1.5.at 19 ("('ohen was tried under a statut applicable throughout the entire
state t AYatt emipt to I suppottis conviction on the gou nd tlh theate seeks to preServe an
appropfiately diorous atmo sphere in the corthos e wherle Cohen was arreSted must fai Ii i he
absence of n' langu ge i tha IIte that ould have pit ap lll on notidC tht etain k nds
o f iiherwv ise permissible peehr conduct would n1evertelss, under C aifiai la, nt betoltatd n crtanlaecs.y utrJ Eato v. i f lusga, 415 U s. 697 697 (1974): (reversing
the conviction of a witness held in O timpt fo l 1singe isolate I age ofstreet veracular' not
directedIat a tudge or oi'eor o the co on ).
See~~~~f 11'nerjl I~ti '-I' i 3
Sc> FUGENE 'Ot.O Ktt. THE FillsT Av{E NDvtE NT;i PR otit FMS. CASEKSi AN D Porc O A ¥¥,
i , MtI Ni 10 ln addition oI ndee:sim aiiig the seope o "exeption to the suppo se
mlc against con tent d iscimi",ni vi I fers no lpa itiin of vvhy it is tha1 go ven m eit
may rieadily- regulate speeh when acing as proiprieto o r educato r bitt is stictly [co nl'iicd from
tetis thiat the reguated spee is not esseuttial to deinociaic self'governane
my
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speech are both manifold and uncontroversial. The government
thus routinely regulates wiw ut First Amendment hindrance the
content f oimmercial and financial speech through laws against
fase or misleading advertising and other deceptive business
pract ices; controls what may be Said aboUt the value of stock;3
prohibits competitors sharingprice information; and, throuhi the
copyright laws, restrains the publication of in fr ing nmateial) 6
More controversiall. the First Amendment seemingly allows the
government considerable leeway to regulate sexually or racially
harassin g speech in the private workplaeo.
This pattern of higly protected speech within public dis-
course and readily regulable speech outside that domain is perhaps
most starkly apparent with re spect to Fi rstAmendme it limitations
on defamation suits When allegedly defamatory speech concerns
a public official or figure, sringent FirSt Amendment protection
applies; 6 siinlarly, even when the sPeech is aboIt a private per-
son, considerable First Amendment protection is available if the
speech is on matter of public concern.39  But if the Speech ad-
I e i, ,i I o.(  3O U.S. ' 31 7,72 (I2000) ( WheIher a parI cuIlr otemet c nstit Ies
a t ihrea, blacm a, an aereemet to fi It ic, a ci :oprgt vi oatio n1, a3 pi offe ing o I , s i
ms r an oe to el o ten d s on the prcse content of the 'tatimcntl; KF\
60 t N1 MWA L SO tMIt. CRIM1 AD DII Uss E1 1 A'stA.Ara 3 (1 989) ana] ying whether
coimmu nic ative acts shoiul !be re gulated as cr~i mes).
See('ct. ludu a & I'c. op ' Pub.t, coomn 47U' 57 ,
1 980)va Sta d of Pharmay v.i 77I-72(1 9 7 6 )............... ......
?ee 1~i 7 (iFR. § 24010b-S(b) (20031 (prohi bitinigmi sleadin g st atementsi in oneciotnSit the I~ pucaeorsli fseuiis
JA, ;.S onVaumCCo,10US1,28(91(stin htpiefxn
agtee meis are a pers sxolatI of the Sherman \n-I rust \ct)
s 5ev Llre v .. \ 'shcrofti 12 S. iCt. 769 (2 003 (holdin g tha when C ongres s no0t a l-
te red the traditio0nagl co0nt ours of c opy-i g ht pro t ection fu rthe r First Am~endmlent pro!6tection ii si560 (1 85) (reject-
i h Fi rtAendmnt defense b a a that ingd Preidt Gerald I ord c0-
right in his ihn soon-to- be published im ioits)
Se Harri Forkli ISys, Inc.. 510 1 17 21993);RAV v 'yo st. Paui, 0
US5 377. 389 (l992) C' rSlexually detogatory 'ghting worids,' amnmg other words. ina pro
due a violation f i Vis general prohibiion agaihikt sexual discrinnaion in epotm m
praties.), (,iatio) omittd): M erNoir Say. Baink .Vinson, 477IU.S. 57.73(1986)(stat
in tha evere and per sisteis,et sxtial hsaassmn ait constitute violation of 1 Vil \)
Roiso, IacKsonvil 1 hiyads Inc., 76 VA) Iup 146 54-7 Oia. 109)1 )hodg
iat le Firt mendint does no bar itution again ntinued 'erb a harass mein1t antc d di s-
play of sxually explicit phOtograpss found to contibite to stial thaass ient i violati0n Of
itle VII of the Civ Rigits \ct of 1 964)i .guilar v i ReIlt Car S)-- IInc:. 80 P.2d 846,
858 (Cal 199 9)(holdii that the 'irst A iieii dosii bar uiuetion against 1on)t iLiud
useofraialepthtsin the worlace' founld to otrbt to aI hositiounni i lo
of state ant-discritniriatton law I
11;;eCti Pttibl'F(o Butt,, 388- 1I5 13 1 55 (16) N.Y fie Co I Sullvan
376 US. 254, 283 (1964)(
' cejvRbnWlhIc48U 423, i345-46(1974
[ \ () 1, 5 4: 4
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dresses a purely private concern, no First Amendment limitations
restrain the normal operation of defamnation lawi 0This special constitutional immunity for speech on matters of
public concern was recently extended to thle criminal lawN inl Bar-
nicki v. opp)erj which involved a federal La making i t a crine
to int rcept cell phone conversations, or for anymoo to publish the
coentas of such a conversation if that person had reason to know
that the conversation had been illegally intercepted" TIhe Su-
preme Court held that because the illegall y intercepted conversa-
tion at issue in thal Case was "truthfl inforInation Of public con-
cern," it was unconstitutional to impose either civil or criminal
labilit on "oleone (not invored with the illegal interCept) for
publishing the contents of the conversation. The Court noted,
however, that such immunity might not attach if the conversation
was ofpurely private concern.4I;
It is not just the content of speech, however, that determines if'
speech wiilbe considered highly protected public discourse the
setting in which speech occurs is Also cucial. Suppose a pharma-
cist erroneously writes instructions on a bottle of prescription
medicine and the patient gets sick No competent lawyer defend-
ing the pharv acist in a neglgenc suit would even think about
raising a First Amendment defense. Now assume that a gourmet
cookbook contains a recipe calling for wild mushroons, but the
al-thor does not carefully specify hw to) diS1tinguish the poi sonous
mushrooms froni thel ummy ones and someone ges sick from fo-
lowing the recipe. Here, althou gh a vry si mila halm has bee n
caused, I think that the publisher of the cokbok sued for this i n-
jury could raise a quite serious First Amendmeni defensei- The
difference, I suggest, is that unhke books, m edicine labels are not
a medi.m essential to public discourse.
1 32 U.S 514 (20O0).hk Ai 5i1 2 0
ach! t oj dusu:reS of trade serets orm dometic goI Jo r ohler info mia i o n of purel p is ate
coincem. ':) ae id ati Y35-36 (ieyer and O'Connor .13. coneurnoig) (oi g the (Court' s opin-
ion bec#ause ofiit,, "n arro w" holdue, includi ngi th f:act that 'th!e !informat!in pulici d inwol!ed
a m attr i f uusual public conem, namely, a threat of potential physiUa, ha m to
s e wiii v (1 .p Pu tnam', Sons 3 LFI 2L t 0 3 3 11 1r. 1091 (9 I I hotdi t Ihat
t he pu blisheiri owd no dut3 to a nmuShinotm enthu siast who b ecame V iolently ill! after eat ing 'ai Id
mtthroms deemed sae by the publishers bok) ; tatrdozo . Irue, i2 S1 1d 1 1I57 3 l-la.
Ct. App. 197 7) (holding thiat the publishier o f acookbook was not liables th e purcharser OS a
ip e ) ................ . ..
wall
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In summary, the popular view that A content-based restric-
tions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional unless thle
speech falls Wthin some unprotected category is not an accurate
snapshot of First Amendment doctrine. Speech is too ubiqu itous
with too many real world consequences for there to be any such
rule. Rather, the string presumption against content discrimina-
ton opeines only wthin a limited (albeit extremely important)
domnain.46
B. Democratic SelGover1nne anld Free Spch
What values give American free speech doctrine its particular
shpe. including its intense hostility to viewpoint discrimination
and its special solicitude for speech on matters of public concern
occurring in particular settings or mediba Despite attactive nor-
mative argumentl by such distinguished commentators as Profes-
sors Martin Redish and C Edwin Baker," is pattern shows that,
as a descriptive matter, a comnnitnent to sel f-realizatioin or self-
expression cannot possibylie at the core of the First Amendment.
Indeed as Professor Redish readily admijs, a constitutional COm-
mitment to the "development ofthe individual's powers and abili-
ties" or to "thie individual's control of his or her own destiny
throuLgh making life-affecting decis Oins !i is inconsistent with tle
entire Concept Of "unprotcted speeCh," such as obscenity and
fightingwodsL
SSee iJAI S WiV INS \Ii I\ -uprot 14, at: 4-48 I, Ie I~oRod OworIn TheLwi,
of g;'ieain Pohr ii<s, N.i Y. RFY.V BoO K, SOct 17 1 2996, at 2i n 15 ("(onsittio 6na a t's
Ofic2I .iY s[ha[ all coiini. on spech, are ban1i prin cipl: and the exceptis most be
dinsulte d, one by one a sPecial But th e ?a st n inge of acts o f Speech tha t arie plainly not pto-0
ecdbsteirt'nedenmasit analvttcallycl~earer to say that it prot-ected speech that s
L I a'i .I 'd, \t BAKER. I IIM J I IE I, :,O FRFF DOM OF SEEC i: 3;419891 targuing
thiat libert thory pto ,4ide s ":the most coh eent tmdersta aiiig of the fir st amenent")i~i~: Mainii
I Redish, The , Ioe of Tre SpaI I 3;4. i. P ) 1 REv. 591 595 (198t1 (agut' g itat s el
re aaown is m the ol ic -ale Iirthee by free speech)
~ Id. at 593-O RediSh cont-inue s
protctio of free spteeh, t is l kkeihai the Cour's appoach to nImerous isue s : of
iF ir AmndienIt 1on0imettoit stould have to change ile 1ot ssoevel' concept of
speech. !is htc re o gni~zeS a sublet e of speech inrth d o 101 onMstit io, l prthc-
ti0w told dhave to be aban~doned4 . . Oce tine rco{gniZes t hatthe pi mar salue
of free speech is as a means of fosteinindvda eeoien n iigtemk
ing of life aM-,ffecin deiions t inappropriatenes f distingiing betw e en t he
aue of' diff eent types of" spe becme clear
Id. at 625.
Moroet it woui~ ld be anomalou toS posit the existence of such a broad funuda ment al l ib-
lib!erty:interest :in its :subistaniv e due :proceess :jurispru:dence,:as thou gin :by t:he i :nmal scriny :i::::::
applie d to laws piohbiting thei termiiinally, ill fr-om o btaiing a ssi st ance in endin~gthei hlis'es at
[ \ () 1, 5 4: 4
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Another popular candidate for the lundamental norm underly-
ing the Ameican fre speecI principle and one particularly rele-
vant to the inquiry here is the sarch for1 ruh in the marketplace
of ideas. 0  whiie doLIbIess a value that info s erican free
speech doctrine, it is surely not the basic value. Otherwise, the
First A endment would no t let the go vernment distort te mmarket-
place of ideas thr-o u gh pro p aganda, aS it does anytime we are en-
gaged in a war Nor would the First Amendment allow the gov-
ernment to suLbsi dize pro-denocracy speech or speech promoting
racial tolerance wh 1ile re fusing' to fund pro-CommuniSt Or racist
speech. Anot her fu ndaImntema I sho rt co mi o'f tihe ma rketpl ace o f
ideas rationale is hat the eni premise that fre trade in ideas will
lead to the discovery of truth is highly contest able:
th ieo hi tocosn.Ws.v ~ul.br.5 .. 72(97.Anotheri fundamen-
tal def-ct with the[ e-reahattion rheorl is that it ftfai t o suiport fr'ee speechl as an i ndependen~t
principle Rathier, under this theory, free speech is enirtely subsumred by this broaider berty
pil IRc l p t R i i St ii A P i Cihttrittt At I NI tRY 60 (1982 )
(T a Ir gumeS fm slf- f i ll mn t I ap eaI under crical scruin t- he little more th a n ar o-
mnis for general libert y We l i tle in particular abou fre pfeech eIcep t t hat r- spee h I
can bI ubum d i une orod notions of personl freedomt 'I.
III r quare a libety-base d fre speech t heor with the limited righ oI autonomy
r ecognized b3 the (6 o.urt in' the s ibstanixe { due process ces, andto gigve the princeiple an in de
p e ndent e x ist{ece from a g en eral libertyyprinci{ple, ithas b een arguied that the free gp eechg p ring
Siple specially p ects self-expressin e s ,t 2:- -2 i lk-
age o if s pech ¢to thou gght. to m an' centr ial eapacit' itoi reason an iwon der, i s w hat plaes! i above
oIther forms of fufl menad be tind the, rovItinei jltv ttiiiino lthe tat.)Asadscit
extremely expriessive a cti vity that the go ernament may readily{ regttilat. {including nu de dacing
se e (g of Erie , op's A At, 5 2 U S 27 ( 2000 fightig worts, and o bsiti y Se lmllle o
notes 16 37 and aceotnpan'rng text
I iitinoedb Johnl Milto iith ssenect cenur see, Vill Mii, AREl
(WOtt] tit- A. l [ mitt i i t U Nt ECI fNs 0 PRIN illi, (OctaO R( al \re ooks D-RO M 1998 )
i6 44).te trtih-dmseover raional r speeh wasfully' dIe'ep1e1d i t hem i ddle o t he
niseteeni century b3 Johnl Sm-iart Mill See Ji i lA M t ONlit o X? (fdvvard 'IIexan-
der ed, Broadview Press 9 9 9) (18 591 It wa introduedinto Supreme (our uris lprudenc  byo
Justice OJlver Wendei 1olmeswho wrote that 'the ulimat e good desired is b etter r:eachied byf~ree trade in ideas" and that "thie best tet of trothis the power of the thoughtt get itsefT ac
ceptelld in te cmpetition of ihe moarket . Abr g . United States. 250 1.5. $616, 630
Se Rs v Sullivansoo US.l 3B194 (1991) ("When (ongreIs estblished a Nation)al
I ndoineitt for De c ray to en cou rage ot her covintries to adopt democratic piisciptes 1t ,as
not tiinay required to funId a proigrqam I eourage cotaeing lines of pt ical philosophiy such as comis'iigim aid fascim " (citation omitted)) Sec aso Nail mtclow menitfor+
Ihe rt S I in le 524 1 S 6 597-98 (19981 (ealia, J concurrnJg). id at 61 2-13 ( Joter,
di ienting) .
(Plsy ehologica in isights, exte nsively r-elie d on by5 adverisegrs anld prop agandss
should eviserate lfith in the abiity ofthe Iaiketpilce of i deasto ead to the "est"
iruths or unetdn .ncd. undertandinigs miild pe d on the form alnd
quantity of inputs and on people's interests and experiences.' ithot the assur-
ane of rationality as the dominait Imea hIch people evaliate eiupet m g
iewpoints. rohuist debate cant in itsef. be expected to lead tii the best perspec-
my
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But the most significantflaw with the marketplace of ideas
deorwy as an explanation of current American free speech doctrine
is that it justifies free spech that is, in terns of the
good that it produces foWr sociely as a whole. But free speech has
long been understood in the lnited States aS a n individual right!'
oljus as a means of promoting social welfar . Professor Baker
is thus surey correct to conclude that the "marketplace of ideas
theory, is fundamentally unsound both normatively and descrip-
Sinilar problems exist with variations on the marketplace of
ideas rationale, su ch asAlexander Me iklejohn's, which sees the
essence of the free speech principle as assuring that people have
acces to a broad SPeCtrum 0 ideas so that they can vote wisely.
ACcording to MNeikle ohn, the First Amendment does not require
that "on every occasion, every citizen Shall take part in public de-
bate. . .. What is essential is not that eeryo ne shall speak, but that
eerything worth saying shall be said if al broad-ba sed bety
empi cal su~pjpo la h argumen I~llit ro truit !iih e\saports.) SMQ , Iur note 2, at : 2:182-16;K to -!17 ("Th e marke tplace of ide as r~atioine is . contradict ed o stensibly b y ouri eer y day
exper0 I r-ato appe als to hr and p! i, e ha, thoghu ,th , e e x nv e ' , Ii fman
oten ow lerhpledh ouhghtful tenmcc and 
p deItanding.")
I e Globe Nespaper co.0 \ Superior Court, 457 US 596 604 ( 1982) ("be F irst
~~inendinentji Seve t esue ha the inl di~iine can~ lfletisly p artciat in and con-
t~ibut toour republican syxtein of selfgm ent."): (o!hen uh latomia. 403 lJs. 15 24(19)71) p' ihe con stitiona i ri ght of frte e expressio . . putlsg] the deisgionf as to what views shall
be voiced largelyv into t he hand of e ah ofi us .. in thebeli ef that ito otlici approac }woud
cimport is ii the premise " 1o individua l dignity and choice upon ihich oAr p0itical system
r~ests.),Whitn~ey v. (iaiiaa, 274 US 357. 75 (i927 ({Brandeis J.,concumug)(free speech
i s valued "th~ as San end and as a m~ean' s":).
Inl addition to. l an isome sene meimportant thanl thee udcial saeetih
xtroiig iintin, ! shaWrednot jst by awyers and Judges bi by the .mncan public tht e gad-
le!s f soietal good proi du cd by' the spe people i1n i n try have a basic right to vo I ie
teir 1 1iew s on,'! mai-eI of pbjlc conem. n it in t uItiois o 1 , b iousl s!liat d by t hose sIho p o it
1a e broad ibert iMte re st suc h as e lf re'ai ati1n oel e -x\pre si u nderlie the Am eri c a
free spee h pini ple Althoug for the reasons expaOined aho'e0 the It adth of t.e princej
they pos it ix untenable, these theorists are o}n th e ight track in trying to expl ain th !\meiean
free speechpnple asa truly individualight, not j, as meansif promoting ihe good if
socie¢ty
Uikei rights ni *unded in some basic mral preept about 0t e propet ilatii-nhip be
twee t h!e state aii d the indi vi dual inst ru iient all!y-ase right s are vulnria ble t o eiovrid-
den in a eifi inStanc o ve einguished altogether if the uiit ar ian calculu s S&lma s that
soci ety would be berO (. ei ther{ ina a -icul ar m ist,1ce r gener)ll withou this paric ular
ri ght Sos- S{ tiAut[R. usmqa note 49, at 21 (" It the argum!ent fr!oni ruth geixerates a 1-ree S pec
by' wei!g hinig the ititereSi in disco vering truth a gain st the oilrier inte~rests soight to be pi'0rceted."j
Aright f t'e eech basedA on a marketplace o ideas rat ionalewxouldb p aricularly fragile i
li ght of! the uncertain empi iica a is npn i c ii rests.
BAKIi, s ;qopm i note 47.
I \NANDLR Mi k LOn, I "SI &  I AlN i ItS R1AIEO 1 SLF loN >: v I '() I \I 2:5(i 948j
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theory of fee speech proves too much. then Meiklejohn 's vx
proves too little. For this instrmental, listener-based theory does
not account for the right of an individual speaker to voice his v iew
in public discourseI regardless of how often that view has been
stated befor 7 - No matter how man tinies we hae all heard the
message that Osamna bin Laden is evi, I still have a right to voice
that view in public discourse.
Stil, as flawed as Meiklejohn's theory is, he was on to som e-
thing important in attempting to tie fee speech to denocracy. But
to explain the intensely individualistic nature of American free
speech doctrine, we need to look to the foundation u nderlying
the American concept of democracy. What we find is a moral
view about the p ope rehlationship bet ween the state and the indi-
vidua l a precept reflected in the Declaration of Independence and
the Enlighteniment philosophy that influenced that do Cumeni. )ItOn
this view, the goverment I ust treat each of us, in Our capacities
as the ultimate sO Irce of pO l itical auth0 rity, ase qua aInd rationlal
age nts.
It follows froim this precept that each Peison has a Hht to Ity
to persuade others about any matter of public concern; for if gov-
emninent prevents a speaker froI participating in public discourse
b caIse it dislikes or disagrees with the speaker's w\orldview, it is
not treati ng the speaker equally with other citizens Siilarly, if
the state stops speech because it believes that the people may be
persuaded to impIeme nt some unwfVise soCial p oCy,, it in1Sults us hby
de nyling our rational capacitie Si This precept I s radically egal-
Disie e, 6 4i 3 ('011) o i R , 110 9 (1993)
(O 1s CI ,O 20 I 996) 0 hma caonA rt I/ Iseo ol Etrso I it j IPl) I mAFF 20 I i1 1(1972).hA th he iart of the Fiist Amenent ie t~she pinciple that eachi peirson should decide
for1 imse)II por slf the iead elll Ifs deserig l,'L1 of ;xrs io. conieut, and adherlence. our ipolitical system and enutural life r st upon thiS ideal rner rtoad Sys.. Inc1N
!tC(.(512 U.S. 622, 641 (194). he prept that the government must respect thentionny of
it-s sitrzens whle n inviolv ed in pttbic d iscse r etes fa irly roiiSt listenaer' s nghts. Particul arly
thi aseLxtends onl to laws tha\ t addres us in our rol as the ultimate ll sereins nt in otHer
capacii !IS 'his. while the F iri aniendment ipresumes tht in oir c apacities as gosenr vwe
are capable of sorting otit the truth,! andr teefore would foribid th!e goseronment frm prohbiti ng
misleading or deceptive poltic al advertising. the ConStitution mak~es no stich precsumpiton abott
oir r~atiotial c apaci ties qua coisu mer. Hence, there is ito in~t A mendment impedim~ent to l aw
P roiiing false o mi sleadi ng commerial~ ad¢ertiserns o f th e u sual so rt. Sec (ent. flu d o
Ga & Flee. (op v. Pu'b Sere. (omm'in. 44 S M7 75 76 (1980)
t io atg w e knao, ur oi  n best i nteres ts, and thtis mno ostitut*io0nal inapeditne nt to p a ter nalistic
le g islation sich a s imnda tory s eat belt law or req+uiremet t gh at mo6trcycl e rid ers w ear liel inet~
orlasws forbidding even terminally ill p eople from chooin~ig to end thieir ow{nlives. See Wash>
in}gton v.i Gi uck betg, 5 2i i US. 702 (19 9 7) ({pholiniig at st ate b an oit assisted sugicide) A irO n g
awl
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tarialn in the form al sense of the terml. It is also deeply i ndividualis-
tc, for as Ronald Dworkin has explained, free speech is not
merely instrumental to demiocracy it is constitutive of iti"
In a related vein, Robert Post believes hat pubic discourse is
an essentia part of democracy because it "engenders the sense of
participation, identification, and legitimacy n ecesary to reconcile
individual wth colective autonom" t  On this view, an ndivid-
ual denied participation in the dialogue that forms public opi nion
could (and indeed might) rightly feel that ony public policy deci-
sion taken as a result of t'hat opinion is illegitimate.
The norm, then, that best explains the American free speech
principle is a commnitmlent to democratic self1-g-ov ernanlce, not in
the instrumental sense described by Mei kl john, but rather as an
individuwl right to freedom from governmental regulations that
unduly inhibit free and equal participation in the dialo1gue hat
forms the 'public Opinion whiCh is the fin al source of gov ement
in a democratic state" I"The primary concern here is with speak-
ers' interests. Audience imerests are prtected t but only in the
space craeted by the important limitation on th r ea sols that gov-
ernment may regulae speech. Specific ly, when addressing us as
tie ultimate governors in a democratic society, governmentm ay
not limit speech because it bhelives that this speech will lead Us to
make unnwise or even disastrous sockia policy decisions. Similarly,
irrespective of any mistust of the people's rational abilities or vio-
lation of speakers' rights, it would seem that it is impermissiblefor
tie governrment to pribit speeCh for the specific purpose of
bringing about policy outcomes desired bythe govern ent or to do
so merely to aSSulre that inculm be nts stay n poweri To regu late
a nriparerniahismi strain !in reen lt comercial case se S emns, on the surifae at least, inci C s t en t
with the v'iew that gos eminent most r espect ou r ratjo aaitis oniyu ~i tizens Fo~r a d iSCus~ion
ofi the se c as e and po ss ible e xplanaioni' of whyi they aie not inconis iste nt wi hthis vi ess ,see inin'
note 123.
1t is imotant to emphas11 iize tht h pecp that citzen inther cpacty s gverorsar
raoi 0!is an ascnpon notiii a des8cription Tlhus, thte evidence tha Mt human beins ar i fact nr
nearly as ration alas w e woild like to believe does no u nderu this basic premrise of a lib er al
dem~ocracy upi 6i w hic t ' he A in encian' fre 0e pec hpinipl~e ress e s Upro n'ote 52' In co6ii-
trast. this lack oif hiuman raioiality doie, u ndercut thae marketplace of7 ideas raionaic. which rests
oii the preise that humans~ii are iii f'act highl r a tio nal be iiig¢ capabl of! i '!de iiifyiiig truth
t)wo(iR!tNs aupin n ot 55g, at 201
' ost. su pra notie a.a 134 see Robei C. Pos, ~ree Speecd R e/iius Riul
andg S erl ltiusi {n tir Ra<.i' tSpeeeh, Denimc and rue limit 4rnesidrnesii. 32 Vs tA &
MAX I R Es :2 67. 2 8 2f (91 i("The~i nomaivei , essence ot dmocsis thu located i n rhc
comman icat ive proce sse s nve essar somi iiistihl a sen se of 'sel f-det eriiiano n .i . :
Masscs Puhl 'g Co. .Pattcn. 244 V. 535, 540 (SD{N{ 191'7) L handit
lamsomwhti teittatrve. as a desci ptire mailer, in refering to the purpo se ot asuring
accept e d cn st it utioina[ityi ot~ goimnment propagand a that woiulde sem to 0hav eP prec i sel t his
puIoe je jur oe5 n copnigts.I h oeueimycnittoah
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speech for any ' these reasons would violate the core dem cratic
norm ht the people are the ultinate sovereigns.The precept that the people are capable in their capacities as
the utinate governors of society to sort out truth fromnfalsity is so
basic that it may even forbid government from banning intentional
lies about political or socal natteSr in order to prevent the people
from being deceived into making an unwise decision." Impor-
pso l', s il !a nte d; infoaio na f ior the ipurpoe0 of br n gin g a bou a ce rta in io utcome. ;why thenci, i n
the absence of the v iolaion of s peaker's igh tsis tt impermisible for the government* to tryi to
acomphh hisN s game result by ses<fricf i n for~maio availabeto the ptibhc7 fhe answer may
b t ht twhile it is pen ible for the gohmment to try o persuad e popu okf the OW r-
retes S of som e oi b. addot1. iote to the dialogue t a full and frank manr a it is in-dee d i mprmissiblefor th e govern ment to tr to p6ersu a de th~e p ubic by de libert'a ely dstorting
i nfor! maion. eirIet by priiting the digsemiIauon of information or by deliberately omitting
material f ats in its ownI speech on matters ofpublic conern Ihus i may we ll be unconstit
ioa in t he larger. British sen e of the o M f or government to engage in a materialiy mtsead-
t gproparganda campaig su'ch as some have alleged the Bush admtmStration did in the leald utp
to t h a i oI of Iraq Thou gh I arguIably un t oni tuIi on a i th i s larger Sense bea use i t
2 reaehs demoracy's r p  cept tha it is the peple w h are the uli mae d eci s ionmalkeis in a
d mpo acy spat i o )i of ] ot e : ns als key to our foI e o d mo ric go en1ance may
make judicial rcmcdtes for iJ maeriay misleading pruplaganda untavailable.
In coitras. govrnin iatioms that for such Lit illict, pups limt a silligseae
udictia en 11 rced constit u i oal te mIe wihot I o pi4ea i sng s eparat io of po'lw ers S i a i aIS.
in any x c, f or pu irpos f th1is atile. 1 w ll assu me that it is impmissibl e for the govern-
11 1the ! ci to I I ttthe public dIm t l Si so as to Ibi n g ab i a certain pol itial o social
Iu eome desired by shIe govcln men t .! I I laed I Iam lr't o my colleagu e .e ff c MIrph' for hs ci
si Ie q uesion a1d u t se ful c omment s Iat helped m 1 r te my i deas n thi s isue
ment foim pI si hi'ng even some ypesi f demo nsra bly factuall falSe statements (eg that the
Hl-oaiIu st dl't o I't even I f the speake r int entionally tes See gei'1 N1Y.11im . v
Sulli va, lj .Ui254, 288 92 964)(impl yi ng tha if s tatement are not " of and c ne rnir
sl1 iIt jItimfale goelroment; ficia 111 1, t henJI fals stateents abos ui g ~eiti are absolutel pnvm-
leged,,I icit 291 t" ['Ir1s1u iots fo libe ogveent hav Iio pla' 1 1 1ce sit the NAmer IIIican
s f unsprudeocc.). see alsogtidisii m. $6 on. 619 F 2d 692 1th i 19 f) statling
e d no Iegard i ntentio nal i IIaemens iof f ct made duri n g an ele I!Iam-paigis as "lection frauds" in h oriaryasee The merits of a b alltissu e are mat
ter rI eve d Ior pu bc" an p i vaei di sc i si oI idan deb ate bet ee Io ppo ne IIs and
SPrINats I iS for the voterS, no this u to d ecide whom to elec and wha b
Id as694 (ootnote ottd
If, l I oeei, fal se factu l statemet I ure t h reptatio ofI i d ivida the privilege t
miake f'als fa.tual st aenists is pblic dis cottise! is leas th ab solcit 5c (sen! s. Rober0t, -
Welc, inc.418 Ui. 323 147, 349 (197 1h(stating that Ile statements about a private person
ott ,' I a!;: 11ate ofL ptbi 1tei iay be subjec to liblt c lon as liablt is no1 t itacae with-1
out a swimng o fault or actual dainagesf' So//iro, 376 U S at 279 ( stating tat1 fas sIa te
meIn s abi I t fh offII a l of apublic fi Ial may be subjct t oIa liI y if m e ith fal s
o i lec k  i 1 ; d rgd i i ifor tIl II t I arte- aI . l r ii c at s i e .f o au ghlon 491 tUS
67 1 l98 9) (uolding a defamat judgmnt gain a new paper in a s u it b a p u b ic ft i al
w h er t e offic a 1 ho d tit tI e I I epa i pe ac ed i th reckles c  sreg dI I te t i 1 in p b-lishirng false statements about the o fficial).
Ihat the I iast Am ennte nt allowS recov'crsy for d efamati vti pub lic di scourseis not
tn theory sisseos with the iesis iat go ertussetat may nco re Iate speeh beau it dis
trsts the aIity'" t Ihe pol t' mIke p;pe r d e isions o mIat of pIil Ic , cern. iefam-
tion last pin ie reovery' for false stateensI not becasise goei'me fears tIa thes e st ate-
agy
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tanty however and consistent with the view that hat the Amei-
can free speech principle derie s from the very ess ence of democ-
racy rather than some broader liberty principle, this strong anti-
paternalism feature of free speech doctrnne applies only wYhen the
government regulation addresses us qua citizen, not in various
other capactieS, Such as consumer& Thus with respect to ordi-
nary commercial sPeech as well as in a host of olher situations in
which people are considered dependent and vulnerable rather than
independent and rational 67 the First Amendn tln poses no obstacle
to the governent banning false oi misleading speech.
Cexic al orde of FIee Speech Akrms
Core, SeOndar and Periphel al
It i s this individual right s oriented commitment to democratic
self-governance that, in ny view, forms the core of the American
free speech principle. It is properly referred to as the core for
three reasons. First. this norm expla-ins more of te current doe-
tne that does any other contender. In addition, regulations that
offend this norm arc invariably held unconstitutional even i thle
government call s how that seriouS har will result if the speech is
left unregulated. But most importantly, the command tht gov-
ernment trea us, in our capacities as the ultimate sovereigns n a
democratic society, as equal and rational agents constitutes a gh
in the strong sense of that tem: an interest possessed by an indi-
vidual that cannot be violated even on a single occasion because of
tle reasonable or even certain belief that we would all be better off
if this interest were sacrificed.6 8
mt 'a dl ad people o make us Ie social pol ic u rdamnt, Sbuti to protect the repltation oi
individuals See !!Ifru, note I I9 Still eases aoing re over of fl se statements of fact in
pu blic d i coulrsc shot hat the a ntipaternalism pti ne ple underl ying th!e First Amndment does
niot e xtend to the prohbi]tiono as thtal st ateme nts to preveni een a scripitivelv-ration al
au di~ee from b eing misl ed i nitu forming fase ebeief abouti p ubi fficmials orlprix¢ate !nd i
idual im/okved in atters o u public concern t wo11 uld theiefmic ppear that t he aious de
g ren osf onstgit utional prtectfio o vide d to falsge factu al .statements inthtlese ca s es do no t
derive fium the b asic precept of citi/en rational it y but rather{ are best explained as prOitectiitgpaker pariciptory' righs sand tloe informaion o needed r deiocati self-goern 0 c1an11e.2
See mn/ru note 75.
se Sasuptr n'ose 5. 9buitsecimfrna not~e12 3 As does Profes sorf Bakeri i usethetern "cu iet-
t n!!!ot in is Sct legal se n s e but to refer t p eoplei dI a sk e our legal oer aid b o und b y
i lass s. See ( . dw in B aker,; Puterorlisi.: Pu/furs, aod Citizen"Freedom: Ih/ic 'irm
t>ueeeh Quundcajiin Nik,54 C\,S- W i 51 R 19
~ Se Cent. I: Oa u G s &rp b. Sen Cumn. 447 l J§.557{575 76
(19 80) v i 'VaState B of Phiamiacy v nsier C ouil, 425s1-. 7. 77 1 -72(1i97 6)..............
2. 41. (200.. (itn htwti the.... . .  "pubi comm nicti. s...phere v... peop, le are pr. -iectinied
sSee #Ro tiN DSO R i N, TA . KiNt (Ro is iSSi RiOi .S ~xi (19 7 )("l id v dti ai ughts area
[ \ () 1, 5 4: 4
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Even if there would be a net gain to society (as there might
well be) if people were prohibited from spouting hurtful and offen
Sive racist ideas in public dis,,course, the First Amendment prohib-
its such a sacrifice of the participatOry rights Of racist speakers for
the greater public good60  Indeed, precisely because each individ-
ual in this society has a fre amd equal right to pa icipate in the
discussion by which we govern ourselves citizens in this counry
may vigorously critize governmental or social policy even if do-
ing so causes no just offense and anger, but much more g)ievous
ham. Even if the government could show that the exp\pression of
racist or anti-Semitic ideas in public discourse leads to an increase
in acts of diswcrminat ion or even violence, against minorities or
Jewvs, the First Amendmendt wold still prohibit the governm ent
from punishing this speech so long as it did not directly incite such
illegal conduct.' Similarly even if' the government could show
that antiwm ar protests were encourg ing our enemies to fight harder,
and thus weN e likely! to lead to increased deatis of American sol-
diers on the battlefield, he Firt Amendment would nevertheless
forbid the go0 vernment from stopping these 7r2te S t S
poiicial tru mp s held by vind nividas I di idal hos ri, ght s whe, fo r some rea son, a collectiv e
goal is rnot a suffiient in!sfeianion lbr denin~rg them what they wish as mrdii iduals. to have or{
tdoornta su ffic ienti lu sif!fiion forimina So g 0me loss or tinJ ur 'u ponithem t.
f Ie v 1'i I Biick 123 S 1 Ct. i36 12 i 3 i ( ' ; I Iopii of w Jo mj(oined by
Rehquis" i (; and Stevens'Ond Breyer, U (holding Ku Klux K member have a, !,,I
AmendmenI right 10 t rn a croS s pa of alpllitical rally a s a 'statement of ideology y t may
be tn even a a political Ially, aouses a among
the lat majirift of citizen, who see a burning emss B0u thi ense of!anger or hMatrled is not
sIfficient lo ban l b i " at It (p Ino i of So tI ('r ,l oine by K 'nne dy an1ld
Gin s bu.ir g 2J ii (findin g{ that a Vginiia crogs b ur inig statiute unco nstit ioi6naily suppre s ed the
ideologicalmessage of Iw Ir ot Iesta st u1p re mac.").Seeaso WNS i IN. s a not e 14 at
S2 59 (explaiin! g tha t unrder curii ren idocinnr e racists h ave a I irs t .' iindmi ent r ight to expre ss
their ideas a pit of public dis4 u se.Or mor i ~prei sely. to be f'ree from' gosemnment r~egulfation thlat utid uly itie feres with
Sec Birandenburg v . Ohio. 39 5U.S.i444 (1960).
fhu In Aiasss 11/i , if( t. 244 V.535i539 151) N.Y 1-9171 log l earined
[1 virulent astack upoit th w ar andlg os laws w hih have beets en aced to asistpro6secutiona interfere with the suceess of the m ilitary forces of the United
States. hat uch itc raiics may hae te ef f l It so aseit! cd t thm is unhappily
t rte pu bitcattio of ts kind enerv ate p ublic€ feeling at home ichg r is theirche
pIp j I ad Courae the Cces o f the e emies o t he tCe d St ates abrIad, 0
wich ey ii are gen-erally indif tferent. Di senion ii n a conr is¢ a hiNgh source o f
cofot an1d ass',isace, to it, s dnm~telea itmaio of -It the set/c u!-Clpon withjubilation.7 l' eire cannotid b e ititest qttesti on' of the ishielvousfi.'t of ee Sneb
Non eiheless. iIudge fand onIlu de d th at such speech was wihi the scope i tha, rig to
crt'iise e ithei r by tem ~perate reasig i or by Yimmoderate and indecen ,invecti e. which is no r
maily privilege ofit individal in cintriesIll dependt po tihe free e Xpre sion o pinion
a tii iitnate surce oif authonty." h.
awl
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Although I believe tha for these reasons that a basic precept
democratic equality and citizen rationality forms the core of thle
American frec speech principle, I do not contend that this precept
tells the whole story. To round out the picture. we have to appeal
to some of the social "wfe concern s discussed above. But here I
\vant to distingui sh betw e en importnt s ecofndadry values, su' c h aS
assuring the free flow of information needed it make wise policy
decisions, and truly peripheral ones, such as the larger ommit-
ment to the narketplace of ideas.
Although assuring adequate i n formnion flo\w is not, in imy
viewacor First Amendment lue i e ensejst described, its
relationship to proper functioning i of the democratic process en-
dows it Wth special importance ' Thus the Court has on occasion
protected speech because i provided information needed for in-
formed decisionmaking on matters off public concern, even in the
abs ene of a violation of' solme speaker's participator ri ,ghts.7
I one it does not easily esiato thle protecionof nonideaional art, such is a bstract
painti~ng o symphomn m !s ic Perhbaps suc e1- pNress!ini s highly! prut cn.ed bect art asa
mediumist sg itally connectede topbi icus.Sew N1ttspans 4 t4 nti
regarld it is lncctn o note fthat auth11oritaa gvt'mns ae uprse Cett'in types 01'
nonildeanal ar,1 lt on th! suppos 1 itIn that, rdlcs of the k1 ait Inet h art in 1uestionwillhave a coutingii inifluence or lead peoe,! toi question 0autVhorJ*ity d t
ha%" li cost t11lio I oci et o pi )hai ins f '2:ic ie nt info mati o tIb- S o u dgmen t
kn mattc ls of pblic concer wou1. ld be inestimable. indeedProfessor Joseph Riz believes that
the benefit t hat individuaals in society d erie finnsm a free e xchange O f initirrattin is more i m-portant tha ih co ,re participator right ha e d 1 ec Ib ed
1ff wiereto choos 0e betwveeni liing in a soci ety which ensoy t5' reedoo of 0ex press ion
but{ not having thl-e ri ght my-sgel" or ietjoyi ng t he ri ghtin soc¢iety Whih do es not
ha*ve it. would have no he iaio Injudging thlat my o0wn personal inerest i'sete
served by th ii'st opti
JOseph, i Rog nd lndiu'i.,uol J*o'eing I/ n tits V' ilt Pt t( 110o"A1N 29 39 (1994).
li addt ion at some extreme point inadeqtile access to l rinfoilon a n e sai to ipr the
core democratic prept ofp pplar sovereignty or w it hout a certain quantm 1of information
available to tem, in l n maningful s can the peopl be said to be governingsiety: This
is true even i 11he ulikely ease that govenment wee tol Imped the flo of information to this
make wise choices oIrfor an other illegiimate re ason, Ih a i olaItion of instrumena nors
caina extreme ease econstitfute a brieachi of core normis reve aling that the d istincti oinbeissee
the co)ie and ihe p erip h e ofrights is so hat arti fic ial. le distinction isi hoever, no ne the -
le{s s help'fuil, perhaps even h neessary. fo ae coher~ent conituti oiialrtig htsg j urispr~udten e.
'ths i I it arIA Bank I. OhclLom, i 435 !Iu~w IS 765 li ff7).teCor.j .itildac
Ma a, Is ; s t ia prohih iig o r io n S fiom madrg co nri buio o r 1 epe1idIurs ' f'or the
purpos e of {infu!! ieinig or affecvting the vo#te on any{ quest~ion su bmi!tted! so heV ot etS o ther!
n i materially afti n g are' o[ ft hpopr snes or asse of the cIpor aotion and
Ssiel furt h er1, rv4ided that reIereda reg aring tx isues s hall not be "be deeed aterially to
affet:" ai corporation ldl at 768 h quotin MASS. F - AwS ' (h. 55, 8 (eWst Sup p
P,7 5)j. Ihersrcinwa hlegdb cop;Iton pie-te f'ioin spnig 0otyt
come tax.in respotnding so the coteio hn that cor-poWrations b ae no First "metidincit r tighto
speak. the .owt in an opii on by ustce Po wel, resposndedth3 at "[]he ( onsflittion often pro-
tects intrest br oader thanthse of the party seek ing teir d ixindcati n tit tiethat ha
'4t[ ]hc Fir~st Ame ndment, in paicuii ser ss iranr sorfirrd interes ts "d. at 776 empha-
[ \ () 1, 5 4: 4
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H o\eer, coin fimi ng that law that impede public access to infor-
mation ncedcd for democratic decisionmaking do not implicate a
core First Amendment right, or indeed a true individual right of
any descriltiol, the Court has, in cases not involving speakecs
with First Amendment interess at stake, often deferred to l egisla-
ive conclusions that restrictions on in formaion on matters of pub-
lieconcern is juStified by some greater social welfare considera-tion,
sis added) see n/a U at 787 (i A co mrial ade rtim is o" 1n suit iJonaly p o tec ted noto
much becu -it pertans to the Ser's bus1i ne;S as because it torthers the societ[a inrest in the
Iee i o f infotaon") The ( oUr fou n1d t/hat the speeh ta ,h(e corpo ratio 1n in t hiS c ae
w Iish d to 1 gage in l AthA e t ype of pe ch indisp ns abl e to deisi o A m; all g in h dem, Onacyi h,
I"at 77 n l I, citing atrF I aI a aifkI i ON 1inte 56 at 24 26. Stmilary, the rato n-
ale6 ofS ome com-ercial s peechcaSeS Seeis to bei asuaringithat the ptibh is n~ot depns'ed of
1. of l PhaiImacyl. ba Citize C su e r I ( A 12ciZ Ic., IAf,42 .S 74l (1976 )
Ma ssa hi set s l u n oti utinal ts no t limted tthe m eve d epr i :atio If iInforma tion ne eded
for democrtic seI'fgovriIanc. I n addit ion, the Cou r t 'nd that the laI at issuei i i t his ca s e
sug gc sts an at empt [ the legisl ate ] t give i d Ie o:f a deb ab le p I b lic ue stion an ad-
ourt ftitid the stateds concem that speiec by IJI'lh and powIl" corporations w otid nd1
toi "drown t i nt' iither pint oi f view impe rmiss i bly ypatema listic and enttiari toi the core de moc-
ratic prece bpt th at! "the peo6pl ini o tirdemoceracey are en~truste wxit li the respo n sibilit y for ,u d gitig
and exaatinfg the relatxe merit o A, f co n fli ting 1 rgumn t i s . a 7C9I 701. Sinilarly. recent
conanei-cial speech ease s b a,,e emrp ha sieed this an tip at ernialism raton[al e See /efro note -12,.
Ihtnwii e5 i I o r, 7 514 (20011, discu ssed topic'A notes 4144 and Icmp i A n ig t ex
it a iother case InI hic th e Co rsee J ms pr P imari! ci nerned tha t tA h e p ub hlic not be d epi ed i f
intorion ess e ial to democraticd eistonmaki ng rather than speakers ng h ts o r illgit imat
p roxiding] i mity from lbii ty for diseint ll e t I Ogally obt ained in o Ati n t o spec on
mAters of p lic concern. See a 529. Still, the ex i s tence ot ai i ith partiipator rig ts
ince tfamn wheitheir c onc ern th at th publi notb!! be deprived of informa! t! in necessa' to de moc
r atic decisim ninalong xx as the. u/c f irst 'Sme dmeni t sal ue vindicat edin that ce.
-See C e n. l Itel  v f--C , 124. S. ft. (s1, 694-98 12013). In that ease, the CoLrt tip-
held a ban on expe ndit)ues by c Ir Vin Ofr lbor uion, for om municlfions 1hat refe 2T " a
learyiiden'dtified Iatidate for fd ral offie" which hare 1\ade 6 0 days bfo i1eraI e lecion
or30 da ber t a P im Y el eion. d at 767. !nvoIig xre s p ct for Ithe g i l a I j 1u1dg ment
that the special char#ac[t, er ii of the c ooate Stite equ i re pariticularliY c arieful regu lamio}n,
i. at 695 th e (ourt f'ound that suppresion o this spe i l sid by the iIterest in u xai ing
the "corroSire and distoiing c O of immens aggregati so wealth that are aum ulat-ed
wAh the help of the corporate form and that tOe itt le or no cortehton to the public's supprt
as 1e asin preenti "Mi'rum ention of said oAti r ibutin Imis" imposedon th ese entitiesI
Idat 695-96 (q.iotation: ma rks an itlaton-s omitted). Se n/s Austiti v'.icli Chamnber of
Commer)c 49 L 5 652 (990) up h oldin a e law rolibitin g c orporatio n s flomi using
corporate teasy ftids or e x pendures ini suppor o o rA in position to )1 l , a adidate in
eetons A fo state offie Seattle imes Co wl: R haneharjI -,I- ' -467 f 118 201'41l rctI ing 1 a FIrst
AmendmIent challenge t a pr ot ei order if a eixd suit pre senting a pfr m di clsin g
iid'oriiai o pu A bli onceIrn obtaited inl discove'). The our cited state' inte!st iii prevent-
ti g pime 1Tia dis overy abuse a d il proteing p0riay yright s f litigants an d t1i1r parties as
tu stfifcation fo r resticting iiformattion. l at 4
'sls helyi ng an ar+ gumeni it that the interes S in the l fre 00w o f inform iiation nue ed ed fori de
mra dcisonmakingis acoreirstmentC'ali is t-he well estblished propo sition
tha citiens bae 1 io gerIal Iigt of a ccess to go crme info nsatio n /emeh vRi sk 38L
agy
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Another social welfare concern needed to account for the e
panse of spedch protected under curiri doctrine is a more general
commitment to the marketplace of ideas, encompassing not just
expression on political and social 1atters, but miathematical and
scientific speech as we'L However, although such speech is in-
deed pr1 tected, i receives even less p rotection than information
needed for democratc decisionmakin,g Thus despite the consid-
erable lip service paid to this norm, a comitment to a divrse
marketplace of ideas is a norm quite distant from the core of the
American 'speech principle.
(s (1965) F ;liie  ghtt slpeakl and pubsh do es noi carr with it the urestraiined right to
prtes s t hat t ha da F irst A m end ment r ight of ace s s to p r isons in o r dc to gath1cri info rmation f
I h ere is n dii s cernible baSis fo a co nst itutio0nal duty to d diclose, ori! mr standardS
0( gielines absent statutory stan d aids hu ndreds of gu dges stoul1d. unade r[s uch an]
approacea large to fhSshi ois ad hoc sta n dards, !in !inividual caises, accordinigt
their rown ideas ofwhat seems "desirbe"o' epedient. We, therefo re, reJectth
Cor
'
t of Appeals' coiichisory asriO n thatth public and the media hase a 0 irit
their in mat es and presumiably all ot heri publicfa cili ties inchi as hospitaXls and mena
l[ ii I[.I3I 31T3 IT
-louc his S. KQVED, Inc. 4 38 18 1, 1i4 ! (07) ( plurality opiion)~i;ei so'~i atoIns An geles Poli ce
Depti . United Rep oting PblgCorp. k528 U . 32I40 (99; i i ' ctTgdfacialcha) e to
Cai!forni!a l stallowing arrSt records to be disclosed onl yI for rtai pu rposes, t Co
m1aks hcitwe b ae Ie u "i s nthinIg iu th1 a gox!nI tl d l f a s i : s t inor-
mation i ts possso" thu theI I' 1 1111 I o I a lft it imal to Cogrs thr1 1 1Ilk I ough last,. stich
as section 52 t Ihe ieed I Informati t to e gilansiy st1r ike 1h pe b1 1 L:Ialan e e
b eteIe the ! ned f'orl g P bemmenta scre and the pub ic's interestii ution eed for
democratic self governaiae. 5u~ §.S. 6 52 (t0t
l Junige r* iDaiev y209 -3 d 481 i(6th Cir.i 2 00j )(reversin'g su imaryi jidgme n t againsi
plai cIalenging the o s itti ti oa i t o f a fcder r I egtl ai I ' I re .st r icting i m from po TICg
encrIyptio n soware 'nn his Ieb Ie court resrseS isue of I what letel o Fi rs I mendi ent siI
ScBerIsteii Uited St at es Dep' o lustice, 176 F 3d 132 i ll35 (9th C i r.
1999) i i,:t 11 'i h il , gg,'a ind1,n11 o1 ,by 192F I 3 1,I 308 (9th Ch'i 1999).
7 hi can be seen in tic ;s I thf rioru si tin ap Iediac itiovn ctitoi
o exports of er sptuolcgy see .iupro not 77, or thc pting o the al gorithm fr decipheing thc
codepreeniIng the cpso of DVsSei Uniseisal CityStuios. I '. Corles, 273 NQ"3d 429
fg2nd C ir 20(1) (upholding itJunction against tveb site ottuervs from post!ing comaputer soft ware
th!at dec rypt s dig itiall y itcryp e dm~ niov eo r frt in i nelti din g hype rlinks to other steb site th -at
miade Sitchdccrvping pr'o grams available) DV DCopy C0 oi Ass iv s. Andr~ew Bunncr, 75;
postitig dcc ryption pro griam fo r defe at ing D VD co py¢ conltriol code w as a~ poor re st rain t i n vitol a-
tionr of th!e!' irst \men dnse ni).
Lvrcr 4.shicrot 37 7U.S !!8 6 (2 003) co f!rm S the v iess that a otinmitment to a dts'ierse
m arkepac of Iid ea 1is it a core F ir1st m eidmen I1alu I l e h a le n gers M t he ( oI p y-
right Term xtensi on Act made a strIn g case attl e exten in of1h copyr-ight teim to aleady
existi" g tok s c d i mpedeculhtral dvelopment wtho u t out any s igificant o fsettitig bI nctt,
tosociers. See id. 248-63 (lrieser j., d i ssentingt.-F Te Co0urt, how es.er, su mmaril reje~ictded t he
Irst m a h t t t sIa n ne t sualeci this extension to any
maningful irs, Id ! f t !!; at2 2 or urther discussion o f the rel tioi nhip
Ietsseen int ell e u property l ass and the (t-st Amed ment, e f , aP ecto ill": note
I I 2l l11 \ lIlI ,a - g12t'' tIl'- p ,d I Ii)l
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11L ID EN I FYING THEF REE SP E EC1H VA LUES IMPLC ATE D
InH AIPLIC IIIONOF C A IFO RNIA' sUNAI
COMPETITION LAW TO NIKE'S SPEECH
Now that we have explored both the strUcture Of Ameri!a
free speech doctrine and the Valu es that Underl ie it. we are in a Po-
sition to determine: (1) whether C'alifornia's false advertising re-
gime can be constitutionally applied to Nike's spcech; (2) if it can
be constitut ionall applied, whether Nike's allegedly false and
misleading statements are nonetheless entitled to some First
Amendment protection: and (3) if these statements are entitled to
some protection, precisely what level of prtection does the Filt
Amendment demand? The key to answering the firt question is to
inq ie whether in the absence of any First A me n t protec-
tion, application of, California's false advertisin g regi me to th is
speec infringes tle core free speech vall ues de scribed above. Al-
tho ugh this is a veroy se and difficult lques, tion, Careful analysis
revals that such application to speech of this sort may well in-
inge the core precept a th vernmen must treat citizens as
ration a gents Much More certain is that even if this legalregi me
can be constitutionaly appiied to speech such as Nike's, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court erred in concluding that the allegedlyfalse
and misl1eadin'g statement s in these communications were entlitled
to no Fist Amendmentm protection. For even if not infringing the
constitutive core of democracy underlying the First Amendment,
in the absence of coniderable First Arriendme rnt protection for any
fsor isleadilng statements contained in Nike's public commu-
nic ations, Kasky's invocation of California's regulatory r~egime
against Nike'S allegedly false and m isleading statements threatens
to both stifle and disIort information needed by tile citizenry to
make decisions on vital matters of public concern. Determining
the precise leel of protection needed to protect thle informilation
flow needed for democratic decisionmaking while not unduly im-
peding California'S legi timate interest in consu mer protection is a
much more difficult question.
A. Doei California'Fe Adeiin Regime 's Jmplicae Core
Fre Speech Norms as Alfied to Nike , Spec h:)
As a first cut at thle problem, it is worth nloting) that Califor-
nia's legal regime prohibiting false statements that mi ght mislead
consumers in their purchasing decisions is not on its fee offensive
to tihe core free speech norm that pre supposes tihe equality and ra-
tionality o f al citizens. As to equality, the l aws upon which Kasky
based his suit are facially viewpoint neutral. Section 17200 of
awl
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Ca Ti fornasBusiness and Professions Code prohibits "anv unlaw-
ful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unflair, decep-
tive, untrue or misleading advert ising."'I Similarly, section 1 7500
makes it unlawful for "anyt, person jor] corporatiion" with th intent
o f se lI ing property services to make -an y statement" which is "un-
true or misleaQdg"i The re is tus no plausible arguintm that in
enacting these laws the California legislature was attempting to
elude some people from speaking becaus e it disa gre s wi th their
worldview.
Such facial viewkpoint neutrality also belies any argument that,
at leat as applied to ordinary commercial speech, the state is pro-
hibiing the spe ch in question because it fears the people will be
persuaded to effectuate some political or social change that the
government thinks is unwise. These laws d, it is true, restrict
speech precisely because of its capacity to mislead people in mak-
ing a purchase of a commercial pmduct or sevice, and thu, to this
extent, deny the rationality of the listener. But as emphasized
aboveil the core of American free speech doctrine insists that the
government tre us as fully rational agent in our capacity as the
ult imate governors in a detmocracy, not as consuners of comimer-
cial products and services8  Of course, imay well be doubted
whether even when procesi informati0 oiln matters o'f pUblic
c0oncern people really are rational agents who can accurately Sort
out truth from falsity. However, rationality in this realm is not a
description, but an1 ascription. In addressingL uIS qua consumner,
howen v irte government may treat as us iin accord with what is
probably a more accurate asSessnent of human r atihality: not
i C,\i BL.I PCiW Co . 17200 cvt I 97) (part of Caifbnia s Unfai oipeutios
~'C~s i t S. & P RO: :COOL §175 00 (Wes 1b97) )(parr of CaIifo~rni a' FalS e Advert isi n
Se esiOJW te1t aC on ans'ing &_ tes 5 8-67
Pr ecis elIy whbichb de cisgionsl are witihin the people's demii-ocr+atic pr o gait and thertefor
one s with re s p ect to which the goverin ment n ut r espec o u r ratio nality s a age and di ffi cult
q ueStionsfi beyon d t he scope f th'is arntelei suffice it to say, the se decisions sinclude molie thban
justvoting foor Iagains governet officialM who make pMoicy d-e1isions or 1 een v-otingon
in it iaiiive an d refe~ren da or ap proi v g conas tiutio ns6 on onsti tution 6al a ii d ii ts. Muc mo re
b roadly, sh a de#ionm ak ing gprocS inlud s niig aI op inio On any mIatIr withiIn the
PeoP govering autiihorit' Whil t h e li e endemortic deisionmaki and other
decisions ~e may make in out da ily i ves i not a bright on e it is s ai tsayfl ththe ordi nar~y
eon~uer deislsuh as w\hich totpatlo buy, i ot within th omi f eocai
deci sina king. Much more di iculi is to eltissity a decision not to buy' a product bcause
8f dtSa grceme n th, te laborb practice sonm o ther a-spec f a l business operation .c pp.
1110- 20 ot~a5
s5ce ,upro niote 0.
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quite fuill rational beings, many of whom can easily be misled by
fase or evi merely decepti advertising."s
Although the laws upon which Kasky based his sui do not on
their face implicate the core free speech norms of equality aId r -
tionality essential to democratic se f-go verna nce, it still may be
that their application to Nikes spech in this case does threaten
these norms. Unlike the typical object of'Calitbrnia's false adver-
tising laws, Nike's statements about its working conditions are
inext ricably intertWined" wih a debate on a oatter of public con-
cern. It is not unconmon for tile Court to find that law or regu-
lation uno1jectionable oin its face \iolates the First Am' Ilendmeicnt
when applied Io speech on matters of puIblic concern.' The ques-
tion theretbre becomes Whether, despite the facial idity of the
low, the application of these provision to Nie's speech jeopard-
izes the core Firi s Amendment norms of equality and ratiOnllity.
Applications of Califo rnia's regulatory schemne to speech on
matt rs of plhic Concern ould viOlate these core norms in ateast
three ways: (1) byI ffect iely exclUding speakers from the discus-
sion by which public opinion is formed, thereby undermining tie
legitimizing function of free speech; (2) by allowing ideologically
ntivated private citi zens to utilize California's leg al regimlle to
Stitfle Nike's views onglobalization and (3) by paternalistically
pro tectin the a udie n c fr0 m misleading speech in violation of tle
precept that the ultimaIt governor's in a democracy are rational
aget S.
I. Application o Calibiwlbia 's False . dvertiin Regime to Nie's
Speech Does Not Threaien Anyone's Parrticipaiory hacrests
As Robert Post emphasizes, a core function of free speech is
democratic legitimization. A law that either throughdsigor ef-
fect prohibits a would-be speaker from participating in the debate
through which public policy is Formed "threaten[s] to alienate citi-
zens from their government." 7 More specifically a person ex-
cluded from participating on equal terms with other participants in
debate on a matter of public concern will be less likely to accept
a",t !1'; note' 1 'd1 n; , tI et' ni onl of amipiateralim principle to co I-
mnercial speec h).Sec R ile .NatI Ved'nof'the Blind 487Ui1i.781,796 1 988) (stating tha he all eged
t wJiidcl', witb the hill yprotecte d f!ee SPeech aspect of hriai ble Solc€it ation )R1 S'eecg Batik v. vu~~f- I3 I15 W14 ill, Io Scoso m ae 3
US. 040 (2009, r) t N Orl eans \roadcastg sn Uit States. 2 VS. i 73
1 I9995 Texas v. Johnson. 49 i 37 40 I ( o! Ire ims 436 U 412 (1Coheny. Califoriai, 403 U.S. 5.26(1971).
Po st suia note 67,a 1415
agy
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the legitimacy of any resolution of that controversy that goes
against his interests. It is for this reason that several Supreme
Court decisions, mostly of an earlier era, invalidated even content
neuoral restrictins that unduly interfered with such participationi. t
A good argument can be made that, in the absence of at least
some degree Of consAtitutional iinmu nity For factual mi sstate ments
Nike might make in its statements about the wAorking, conditions iln
its overseas factories application of California's false advertising
laws will chill its participation in tle public debate about its labor
practices, in particular, and globalization, in general. iideed, here
is evidence that the mere pendency of Kasky's lawsuit caused Nike
to decline to participate further in this debate t It might, there-
fore, be argued that denying N ike conStitutionlal protection for fac-
tual misstatement wil effeCtivey exclude it from parIicipating in
thi s important public debate, thereby imperiling, tihe core legitimi-
zation purpose of free speech. There is, holwever, a fatal flaw in
any such argument.
If a regulatory scheme threatened to detre indiv idualcitizens
from participating in a public discussion in hils way, the legitimiz-
i ng function of1 free speh would indeed be imperiled. Thus, First
Aendmet dotdine Often provides immlunity precisely to asSuI
that individuals can safely participate in public discourse," Simi-
Se2 e Schnieid er x. State, 3 F, US. 1 161 193,9)(in din a o leai eiing and
sTang that Cth o T shou lIbe astIte to examine hIe effect o I ,g islt !Ion I that] d- il
ishes the exercie of0[ righits so sial tothe maintenance of demnocratic instituto6ns"): Ma'tin s.
StI!th Ir :3 U. S 14 1 , 145 (l43 )( sining ,dow i aii ordi hIat pro I I hC i i e d dI i is buio n of t
han dbil at eiecs nd noting that this smetiho d of cm muincat iin wa s " e s sentia to the
poorly finined c ai s es of i'tIle p eople) 1or a raie conIiT: p raty e xal p e f such isolicitude
seC it of" Ladue v. Lu{lco. 5i2 U.S. 43,7 5(9) (in alidatin a law thiat prohibited the plac
in g ofn ost sign on r iiesi denitial pro perty, inclu d inga s ign cnt a i ig a politic al pr!o test mesa g
placd in are sidents o ,n roIpetIy: th' n that "[r e oide tia 0 ! gn r 1 1an uu I ally
chiea and coniti ent fot of o i mmi) cation E 1peetally fori ma pesnS of modest reatis ot l imited
mob iity, ai yard or wi n dow sia ma', hiase no praic al subst i tte"! I For a more det ailed d isc u s
sion of t *h ese anid si mil ar c asges seg e LDa tbcate P-roicoo ctiop;s#ro not e ( a 332-a3 4
As stice!! B reyer d etail ihs! !!disenting opiioi n i s case.
Ni ke sayswi t hou e t cnradiction t hat be cat.ise of t his slaw suit it has decide to "te
sI ict sev rel a of its 0oiniiiications on social is Pe) that c ud teiac Caifo rnia
cotisunmers, incluiidi ngSP spe ini n aion*al and internional me dia It adds that it has
no l esd is nul C' !d'1 0 11!opoa te Responianilt Reor, has l I deide not It su aitI
listing in the To .1oneffSustain abIliy Index, and las refus o "do ens ofI ins ta-
ttol o . l ot tm pea0o corporate riespo nsibiliti issues.
il 123 s t. at 2568 (reyeri iii idisse) 1 tc it at is iCitted ).
niy agair~at application o r lexas's Desecatio of Venerated ObIeh t stat t o indi , idl a h
bred an \ mer ican flag ais a meansi of piic al prot0 e st) Cohenv. Califoirniia. 403 U.S 1!5(19"71 (proiding First pinendnen imm unitny agaist applicati of Califoia':1 breach ofthe
pe acee statute to oind isidu al who u sed profa nit y in p ublic i scour se) fg randeiihtir g v Oh io, 395
( ng.. 9 iig irs amendn ki a gaint ppiati on n  o io tatute
poi itigalce fcrmnlatvt to,. indid inl'ein oiia rts) t dit
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ar immunity would attach to the speech o f advocacy organiza-
tions, whose very purpose is to advance the political and social
goals of its members. Unlike individual citizens, however, ordi-
nary bs iness enltities suh as Nike are not the ultim at e SoVereignS
in a democratic society, nor are they entities in need of the legti-
mizing function of fr ee speech . Indeed, it wouMld mnake no Senl Se to
talk about a business corporation "feeling" that the legalsystem is
illegitimate)! Thus, recent decisions have upheld the ability of
viniti ng the -redom f the prS. i t is onl overl oo kedt tiat fhe libel J u dgment oc rtIuttd iI
that case was also again~st foc i i ndixidttal clergynan who Signed the aidx'etisensent publis hed by
Ihe Nexw York i tr;c . id at 256It I TaIo HI,: s I I I I murs. ITI i. IS 'd( I965) (appl yi gFtrst ' simeundmn i imamumry{* recognized tn Ness br- T4crimeta Co. .Srdlnonai to cri minal d!fa ma
t on action broght again a itndx i da l) Oarison v. I ui stani 379 : S 4 (1964) '(ss a m e
G arc ia v. Bd.6 01 due. 01f So iO Co nsol. Sehb DIst. 77 F- 2 1403 (0th Cir. l 985 ('ourt
appli es nal ie": stn d ard brought by pub lic o flictal agai nt sin diridu al).
Sr-i' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ k t I v Masahset k' itzn o 1icI, 47 1.. 23 11 (hodin inc
support o catididaics as applied to cororaionis more akiti to voluntary political a'ssocatiotis
thal businesfrm,"Il sv also McIonlm l "ftC, 12-4 S. l" Wr)1. 9 203 .n"rtn)
provudo ofi t ipartisan Campaign Reibrum Act resticting campaignexpetidiire by
corp~oraions and labor tiiions as niot apply}ingto eniies founiid cottiStntiotlly iia !m mune fr suc
regtlio iini asscscsuseas ('it c-uis [hr Li/hi!*e Inc.) In ddition, ifre e pee doctrine eendv,1as
coitsider able lis 'st -iseudime nt * prottonto the ni ttioa *!> press no for its ow{n s ake. bt-i
b ecaue sof{ the v ,itial role the pr~ess gplays in provi d in informatio6n us the publie nee s saras for
de mocrat ic deci sioiiin aki ng. pari cularl!y iii c hec kin g goxv emm Yen abSuse Se l5-ir st N ational
Baink vBeliti, 435 IS. 765. 781 (978) ( The press eases emphasize the spcia m and
otften ng rticMinis, aid providin a rnm for disuiss!in attdddebate." ). MillS ' Aabai~a; 384
U.S. 214. 219 (196) C l '[ihie pres s serves and wvas designed to se rve as a poaw erful ant dot t eo
any abuises of power by go veritmenual o fhc ials ida acon sttionaly hosen means for
keeping ofiials ele~ted by ,the people re~sponisible to all the people hom they w ere seeted t
ts re "). sr- aeiilso Mc Connell.ii124 S. Ct a697-9 8 (teetin-g a l a imta thie ex eirptioi oft
me d ia coporaionrs pro vided in the H ipartdia anpai go Relr ke)i ct's limit at ion Ott co0rporate
expengd ituares u nco n stitta ,tn alydi scrim ina tes in faxor} sf the se euit i es t;}he Co urt hol6ds t h e lawv
arrow excetion isi wholly consistent xw ith ir i, A i)icdment prtiiple becatise "[a valid
dis tinction* eSist s between co)roaiins tha are p at of the me dia indu stry and0 i oter 0 c roaio~ns
that are no t ins olved iii the regulatrbus iness of imiparing i iexws to thte pub lic' (qu otfing Austiit v.
Michican~ Chamber Cot Comece 494i 3..65,66 190)
i am qtite sympathetic to lP'rol'essorg Baker's v~iet that his pr otecion lo6ws not t'roin the
free speech clause8 01 fthI lir St Aitsndiusent but! fru it the frpr Piess claus See C. Lds in aker,
so urc te prot ction provided to the p'es s sitogreater than the protection proxi'idd a it mdoi-
v idoial engagin n bi c d iscrse. In { f any ce ~i nvi!ng gpuic discoe I by an in divi dual.
tis pari t yo1. protectioiit vil obviate the ised to deide! ithinstrument o f coumunia!iom
ut ilized by the speaker corstiite s "the prss forP prposes or"f! the first Amndment (eig. an
indrsidual poisting a political me Sage on her wxebsie).
S i gnificanty. the c ases tindig restrictions on t he speech of ordi n ary bu s iness coerpora-
nuigins unstitutiona iado so because the r estrictions infri nge audie nce interest, g notbecause
some participatory r ights gi ofi th cororion stre! ifinge .Se sura note 75. For a m ore
xten~i vc discu ston of why d ina y buincss entitie ave InF msi t \m nment particiPatory
r ight s, seeg aker. sops-a note e6 Fo6ri aariguament th at sp eec e by eve n ordinar rb usin ese s
ent iti es fuirthers t he selfi-re aliz ation of th manamgers antd inves gtor xohv orga ti zed suhel
entities. see M art-in II. Redi sh & HowiardM.Wasserm~a. Wht's Good fin- encral Moto rs.'{
C :o1' tr I ST 11 ',:1nd 1 a, !  I ' s 1-: ii press ia 6 6 Cii) WI, sii I . v . 2 3I) 2 I5- 5I
wall
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government to categorically exclude ordinary business corpora-
tions from participation in core political speech, an exclusion that
would be unthinkable wit resp tI to an individual citizen wiShiig
to partiCipate in a public debate.9 '
2. Koslov IInvocation of Califrnia Legatl Reginm Does Not
Constintte Vieipoit iscr-iminaton AttribIuabl to the State
It could be argued that application of California's regulatory
schene to N ike's speech iln this case r ais es the danger of imper-
mnissible viewpoint discrimination. Like abortion, the war in Iraq
and holmosexual marria gee eco nomic globalization is an issue that
prvokes political passion. In addition to concern about the al-
leged exploitation of foreign workers by American businesses,
many Aliericans are outraged that these businesses have exported
jobsI oerseas that used to be held by domestic workers. Untlike the
typical false advertising case, the heated ideological context of this
lawsuit raises dhe possibility that Kasky has hijacked California's
powerful regulatory scheme, not for its le gi timate purp o se 0f pr-
tecting consumers, but to stifle Nike's defense of globalization.
E ven in the absence o f a speaker with participatory rights, selec-
tive suppression b)Y the tt of' informlation onl one side of a social
or political issue so as to bring about a desired political result
would violate the core preceptI that the ultimate governors in a de-
mocracy are lthe people, nt the govrme n IHere, however, it is
not a government agency or a public official, but rather a private
individual who is suspected of invoking a facially neutral regula-
tor ,regime for such ideologically reasons. But in the absence of
some reason to believe that he C alifornia legislature d igned this
oft he basie values u nde rlyi ng the Court's tree speeh juiispinudenc e .Se s;nproi te xt eotipa;
nin~}g note 4a7-49 Tihuis noSu.preme case thiat I a n aw aie can be i-ead as pr+ot etin~g the lint
Amnidme nt partic ipatory Drig hts oif oridiriarm business entities as oposed to the r i ghts of listeners
1(1 re eeie ;{th e io>r matt oin such entities have to ofer
See, McConnell v. l (.t 124 ( t 1.649 20(13) (upholding: a bKn on pedi
turesfro trleasur> funds bY coraions or labor uninis for nieaiins that reter to a
cearly identifed caniddate fo r federali ofie' wich~ arie m~ade 61 days beore a general e lecioni
ori 0 ay, before a primar> elecioni);Austin ' Mich. Chamber of" Conmtrce, 494 lS 652
657-66 (1 i 0 ( pho d tate law ph i bt ing Io irp o rations in using o roate tIeas ur fu ds
for! expendi tue in supr ofPPi! ogr in o0p posit o n to, any ca ndidate in elecions fo r state o 0fif!
ice e a as iup ra note 7 (discu s sin g th~ese ea s es in furthi!1er deta il) iiie B rever thus utmi s ses the
lAii on, to yoI about p ub lic mai ters in publi d ebate. 12c 3 S Ct. at 2560 (reyer .J di s
s 3 iiting (e mhasis adde d
A epn not 63 MA acupanxin tex, "-I" u/An ton 435 U.S. at 7586 in
striking doWn a ban on state law prohiig businesses fron making expenditures 1 mr poli tica l
at ieittpt to *gie one ide ofa debatable pici question an adsvantage i n expresing its views to
the people, thie 1- iri t 'Xiindtrient i s pl ainly o ffended
[ \ () 1, 5 4: 4
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scheme, or allows it to continue, with the specific purpose of a]-
lowing a privane individuals to accomplish something the Consitu-
tion forbids the state to due dirk tly, such illicit Imotivationl should
not be attributed to tihe state. AlthoUgh One could imagine a regu-
latory scheme that fis this description, ' there is no reason to sus-
pect that this was a moivating force for Californa's allowing pri-
vate individuals to invoke its false advertising laws.
Speech May Violate thc ore Prece ta the Goverment Muhw
Respect the R tionliti of its Ciiizens
A much beter ar-gument that appicationof C alifornia's regu-
latory scheme to speech on Matters o public Concern inplicates
core free speech norms is that the audience for Nike's speech is
perfectly capable of coming to their own conclusions about
HWhte Nie or its critics I telling _ thle truth abhout w\orkinlg condi-
tions in Nike's overseas factories. And irrespective of whether the
audiewe is in fact capable of such rational ddliberation, in a free
and demtocratic society that audience to who m N ike directed this
speech oin a m1ate of public Concern must be "entrusted With the
responsibility fo judging and ewuating the relat iv merits of con-
f Hicting argumenSt. "S Consequently, the argument Continues, any
attempt by the state to regulate Nike's speech on th s sbject so as
to preCnt this audience from being misled, violates tle basic pre-
cept that citizens engaged in debates On matters Of public Concern
are rational agents. Te rejoinder to this argumnt is tat he state
is not prohibiting Nike frOm iSSUing false statements about is
working conditions in order to preven citizeins from forming erro-
neouS opinions about gl0balization, or even iaiccurate opinionls
about Nike's conduct per se; rather the state is interested only in
the narrower goal of prevnting Nike from uising false or mislead-
ing statements to induce ConSuImeS to buy its products
Whether the stat violates the core democratic n orm of citizen
rationalit in sekig to prohibit false and misleading statements in
this context is an exceedingly difficult question lying at tle heart
of this case. It is therefore worth conlsidering iln some detail. The
(j' sant Ic lndep. Seb. iS Ont sDe, 530 U;S. 290. 208u n. 2000). i thflis case a
scoldoirrplcdapeiu rormpoiigfr a Student "chIaplain"' to provide prayer
b efore a ft~6ball game i ,,ih a nes pro gram inis hth th b*e stu~de nt boidy select is a st ude nt P e aker
pr eedin g th!e Football! game to "d liser a b rief inVs carin and!o me s sag . .{to sole ron !e thi
evet. The Coon t fu nd that in l ielit o f the schools h istoryv of regular deivey otf a stude nt #led
proye at at hleti c eVens git t s re asonable toinateri that the s peCtfi pu rpo se of the poliey Sias 1(
preserv a poPular >~itate pons~ored ivligio0us ptice'' 1 iii toltion of th first F }meniun' ? s
SBeglotri,435 UiS. aft 7
awl
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question is difficudt because Nike's statements are addressed to
people in their status bO as ctizens and consumers. As a resulh,
any attempt by the state to this discourse of Fale and is-
leadilgstatetmnt also touChes the audience in its dua capacity as
the ultimaite governor in a democratic .society, whom the very
foulndation' Of denocracy command must be tireated by govern-
m ent as independent and rational agents and as consumers, whom
the Constitution permits the stat to treat as dependent and vulner-
H 0w is tis conun drum to be resolved? Altho u gh the dem10c-
ratic aid consumer elements of Nike's speech iay be "inextrica-
bly intertwined." one pos sible solution is to try to disentangle the
democratic and consumer aspecs of the vari 0us d cisions likely to
be influenced by Nike's statements. Under such an approach, de-
cisions or positions taken oi PubliC p0licy iSsueS such a.s the des ir-
ability of' laws restricting foreign labor practices of dOmestic busi-
nesses, or even whether t support a boycott of Nike poductis, are
plainly on the democratic self-govermance sd of the lie. In cn-
trast it cOuld he argued that decisions to p"Irchas a Nike product
that has been influenced by misleading statements shoiuld be put oi
the consumer side of the le. Therefore, the argument continues,
by applying its legal regime to Nike's alleged missiatemenis, the
state here is acting paternalistically only towards tse vho might
be mislead into purchasing Nike's product, not those who might be
influenced by Ihese same misStatements to take some pos ii o n on a
public policy issue related to working conditions or economic
globali zation. Although the eCM of applyin g Ciali for nia's rte glha-
tory regime to speech sICh as Nikes may be t proibi false or
misleading statements relevantt the deliberation of peope in
heir rol as tizen, the stae has noin n to do so Rather, thS
incidental overregulatio occurs only because the spech (though
no0t MCthe is iuns iFIlenced by that speech) is anl inseparable
amalgamll that m1ight both rmislead consumner" as well as persuadt
people to support or oppose some public policy initiative. But the
core free speech prohibition against the state denyi ng the rat i 0naI-
ity of people in their capacities as tihe ultimate governo r s in a de-
mocracy, is a limition on government puwrpose not the Q/frc of
govenment action.9  The existence of such a clear, legitiiale
consum er-o ri ented rea so n for regulati ng false or misleadi ng state-
ments, the argument concludes, thus dispels the specter ihat the
state's real purpose is concern that the people will be deceived by
&e $~J~tO 0 9 Ind fC~)Vp0brtx
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these statements into making some erroneous social pOlicy deci-
Although tie argum nt is superficially appealing, it is ulti-
mately unperSuasive T dIefet in tis argument is that it inc-
rectly assumes that the dcision to purchase a Nike product as a
result of Nike's alleged misstatements is purely an econonic deci-
sion with no aspects of democratic deCisionmaking. For the dual
citizen consumer personait of the audie e in this case extends
n0t jLst to audiewe dehibheation, but all the way down to We actual
deision to purche or not to purchase a Nike produc. A person
wvho decides not to purchase Nike pr0 duCt s because media reportS
of Nike's labor practices have persuaded her that Nike exploits
oerseas workers is Surely actin, at leaSt in part, if not primarily,
ii her capacity as a concerned citizen, not just as a potential con-
sumer of athletic vwear. If this person i s then persuaded by Nike's
speech in these slme media that the company is not exploitiing its
workers, and for this reason buys a Nike product, she is similarly
acting both as a citizen and a consumer.
If, then, he d c ision to purchase Nike's products aS a result of
the alleged misstateiments contains inextricably linked aspects de-
Iocratic s elf-governance and ordinlary consuner activit, how is a
co rt t o decide w he ther the aludi ence to whomi0 these allegedmis
statements were dired should be deemed rational and indep end-
ent citizens or vulnerable and dependent consu mer's? One way to
decide the i,sue is to focus on the format used by Nike to convey
its message . There are two separate, though related, arguments
that caln be made with respect to tle nature of these inedia. The
first is that because the modes of communication used by Nike are
all mediaesseial to democratic selfgoernanceNike's alleged
m isstat ements should be presu me d to be addressed to a rational
and independent audience. A related arg ulmenit is, that precisely
because of the particular forms of cominnauiication inolved in this
Lve toi c ases s h ere there is direct evi dene of6 tl legituimat e purpffo se, the existenc e of a
rebut thie hargetha the stae hias acted trtm an iegitimate rea 0on. s ii Reiton , Playti me Thea
ters Inc. 47 U.S 4 5 1, 59 n.i3 (1986) )(lFlrenitii .1 dissenin g) ( docimeni~tinig evide nce of an
i mpetmissSible le g islattve pu rpo se of rdin~ance upheld by realor ityli ;I) nited State s, . fJI-nen,
91 US. 67, 382-86 (1968) (explai ning thgat the Co urt si llnot strike dos Ca aaially) cnStit~u-
iona st a ut c o n the ba~os o a supposed i mproper! purp!os e); Hone Cr, vhere politi cal seech
cen~ed~ wvith improper govenmiiental mot ive See e >g. Bdlon, 435 Is at 7 85 86 (in sink
i ngdow xaa b ait on state lasw prothibiing buittie s se s from mmakhnag expe nd ituares fo ipolitiea l
speeche thi e C o ur t ot that the legislatire's supsion of c i orpo¢N rate vpeec i th fat e as e: "sug-
gest s an att empt toV giv'e one sid of a deb atablIe publice question0 an adMvantag e i n expre ssingti
V'mes to thie pople the hir st tauiiendotent i s plainly~ otfenided")3
awl
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case the audience is in An likely to be more rational and inde-
pendent thmn the audience to whom a typical conmercial adMC-
tisement is addressed.
AS Jus ice Briyer emphasized, the nedia for communication
used by Nike in this case press releases, letters tonewspapes
and ltters to university presidents"" are not typical adverising
formats 01i While commercial advertising can occasionally make
use of such formats (is there any format imun e from such adver-
tising?) tley are m ore often utilized for public policy debate. In
any evenp res releases and letters to the editor re in our soci-
et, modes of communication essential to public discourse and
hence to democratic self-governanceYo Th e question here is
ethe use of theSe media requires the conclusion that the
audience of Nike's stateints be considered independent and ra-
tional so that any attempt by goverment to keep the audience
froi m being misled implicates the cme ratio nality precept underly-
ing the First Amendment.
As Robert Post has written, in modern democracies certain
modes of communication, including those utilized by Nike in this
ca se, form "a structural skeleton that is necessary, although not
sufficient, for public discourse to serve the const itu tional svalue of
democracy. -Ptt Moreover these media *presuppose and embo dy a
certain kind of relationship betwveen speaker and audience [that
wel might roughly describe . . . as dialogic and independent.
104
For this reason it is iasumed that if a medium were constitution-
All protected by the First Amendment, each instance of the me-
dium woul d al So be protected"O As an example, precisely be-
Cause m0ies have been deeied an essential medium of public
'0 i Nike also bought fll page edioral adxertigementS" irs several newspapers to publicize
a eport based ott won k done "l w Adrew Young, ibrnsc Unied S iais Ambassaor lo the Uited~
a 5P;3 d 24. 24 (Cal X 2002 ). hle full! page c i iomrc ial a dvertiis em entis ate tical modes of
ori]nar!y coimmridal spee h aid e !dditoioa advei!se ment!s hav e lonig beenr an e ssential chi cl e
fo r public discourse. 3cc N.Y. l lines Co. :s, Suillivan, 37 6 U..5 $24 266(1 964 ).
................. Se ..... 123  .... 2.4.. . . (2003) ..(fBireycr .1. d.. .enting) .( [:ih]e lette~r app ears
ousd a ittn a avertsing format, such as ti telex tston or0 n~ewspaper, adverisement.")
iieitattleestonwapreiosndpesrlasltters to nongovernmental
o fficials suc as tii ersity Ypresident s and a hle ties diriectr e o t mode of c omUiin i atiJo n
use al mo st excluixes'l y for pu blic discoeiii nor i is ii of cm municationi as e sential in
o Ur soieiv to de m ocr atic self-gove ran¢}c 0 cr din gy aY s Ju st ice Br yer notes. N ike' u sei ofC
tis form of co6mmuiinicatio is th~ge ne "la st li kely toa iiarrat [F iNi \ m endm ent protecion."i
Iat2 5 6 (emph asi s dcetedj. V) i-h rspect so tis] commniioii it is] the cont efii as muci has
the formnat th!at argues for its inclusio!n n blic disuse, ge: fr/.i at 2565; 66.
: Robert Post, RecipeOrora~ieu ['nie n }i~dmenr~ Liirro 47 St N 'g L. Rsvi. 9 1270
j l i I l.......
X at 125 4 ................. .
d at1253.
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discourse -courts need not and perhaps should not ask wnhether any1
part icu ir fili succeded in communicating its specific mes-
sage
AS a formalistic matter, there is good reason to presume that
any particular ies sage in a mediu m e sSential t0 demoCratic C0m-
munication is in fact par of this democratic dialogue. SUch a pre-
su mp tio n hoth g e nera I Squares wit rea it y, and in addi tion, is
ncessary to the proper workings of democratic self-governan .
Ii the great najority of cases, ony communication in a medium
essential to democratic self-govenance wi ! be imended to coney
information rele ant to democratic decisioniaking. MXIoreover,
regardless of any such intent. the shared social conventions that
establish the MedUM in the fir-st place wiill, with1 respect to any
c0mmuiication, tend to "geneiate forms of human interaction that
are acknoiw I edge d as 'ideas' within the jurisprudence Of the First
Amendment." Similarly, for s uch a medium to serve its core
demriocratic Purpose, the audience for any IpartiCular communiCa-
tin in a mediUmIl 1r pUblic discouSe must in accorldance with the
basic precept that the ulidmate SOverceigns in a democracy are ra-
tional ageints, be deenied rational. But this presuimptioln is rebu-
table. For in stance, no First Amendment protecton would be war-
ranted just becauSe tw competitors Shmred price information in a
press release or through a secret coe in a letter to a newspaper.
What bearing should the presumption that an specific com-
munication in a mediu m essential to public discourse is part of
that disCouse hae Oni the question in this Case? It suggests that as
a formal, doctrinal iatter the burden should be oi tho wishing to
apply California's false advertising regine to Nike's speech to
show that despite is aion to matters ofpublic COncern, Such
speech may nonetheless be rwegulated because it misleads people
into making some decision unconnected with democratic deci-
sionmaking. But because there exists no such purely elcnumic
decisiin severzable from democraic dec isinnia king, under the
us ualaproach to communication inmedia essential to democ aic
self-gLoernance Nike's speech would be considered hghly pro-
tected public discourse. While such a fornalist ic: approach is in
accord witl doctrine, and although giving such heavy weight to the
nature of the medium usually serVes free SpeeCh values, in a novel
1 Md
poi nt. Disgpl[tyd i n a I il17 NesswY ok ar iieXhibititt e Fnoto ,iro staiasia nt0 rt6usl5 ttohing
kn ledged medium ot an ait exhibition 5 Id. at 1253-l54
'S'e \ii' N 1] [ 'o note 14 aat 2214. x 0h\
agy
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an d difficult case like this it would I beliee, be a mistake to give
decisive weight to the presumption that the speech is public dis-
coursej ust because it utilizes media essential to that dialogue.
It is true, as Post saggests hat once it was decided that mov-
ies were an essential medium for democratic seltf-governanceit
Iade good Scnse to presume that any fin is entitled to rigorous
First Amendment protection rather than for the courts to determine
on a case by case basis whether such protection was warranted.
Still, when tihe question was first rai sed whether hardcore porno-
graphic movies were entitled to such protection, it \would have
been a mistake for the Court to have deciied that such protection
was Warranted just because films a sr an ential medi u m ofpUblic
discourse. By the same token, the novel question presented here
should not be decided solel on the grounds that Nike made use of
Imlodes of communication normaillya used for public discourse. In
the absence ol any reason to believe that reglatingspeecsh uIh as
Nike's will threaten the general ability of press releases and letter s
to new spapers to continue to function as an essential mechanism off
public discourse, a more particularized inquiry is warranted.This is not to suggest, however, that the format for communi-
cation used by Nike is irlevant to this inquiry As discussed
ahoVe,_ there is an a Ssumption growing out of the basic denoc-
ratic precept of citizen rationality that the audience of media
essential t pubic discourse consist of independent rational
agents involved in a dialogue about how we shlould govern
ourselves, rather than dependent and vulnerable persons addressed
on0ologically. While the. determination for First Amendment
purposes of w het her an aud ienCe mu st be treated as rational is ulti-
mutely an ascription not a description, controlled in the f inal
analiysis by a o rmat i ve co mm it me nt to d e moc r ati c sel f-
governance rather than some empirical assessment the extent that
an audience is in fact rational nonetheless lould have sone
bearing on tihe matter. And where, as in tlis case, the audience
has aspects of both consumer and tizen, an evaluati6on of the
rationality of the audience targeted by Nike's campaign may well
become tie decisive factor in making tihe ultimate as cription of
t becomes vwhethler tihe audience readring
Nike's statements about it s over seas w\orking conditions in the
newvspaper, either as recounted in l storNy and attributed lo a Nike
i { S.e sj a note 8 2 andaccoe+mpanyin g tex t
:{'cc qura no te s 9 and text aeompany>n not0 e8 s3
! Thu 6 it is no6 co incide nce that democracy has uisually po ved suc esu o n ly in soceieties
w i h ieati v e lyuedu ied i ens d bo a generally a1ble to! om petetly epal- t 'o n I flit
ing claims n pubic o matters
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press release or in a full page editorial advertisenent, or in a letter
addr sssed to university, presidents and athletic directors, was likely
to accept these assertions without critical inquiry or further inves
tigatio n, much the way the average consumer will accept a claim
on a bag of potato chips that it contains only 2 grams of fat, o an
advertisement in a magazine tt a cer tain automobile is made in
the U nited States exclusively by union labor, Or conernsely, as
thiS audienc morelikel Yto critically assess the validity of these
claims in the w"a people ordinarily itend to skeptically evaluat
statements by one side in a coentious public policy debate, sucl
as whether partial birth abortion is ever medically necessary or
whetheKlaws mandating the issuance of concealed weapons per-
mits leadto a reduction in violent crime?!
In light of both the content and format of Nike's statements,
the most reasonable assumption is that the audience targeted by
Nike's campa ign is in fact as independent and rational as aln audi-
enc e addressed in a public policy debate unalloyed ith comnmer-
cial purpose, such as in the debate about abortion Or gUn Control, in
which the pariceipants make any number of conflicting factual
aims. An asertion in a letter from Nike in a newspaper defend-
ing its abor policies or a statement in a newspaper story relating
statements made by Nike in a press release is likely to trigger a
reader's Critical faculties much more than, say, a statement 0n a
package listhing a produCt' s i ngredientS Or even an ordinary adver-
tisement in a magazine, newspaper, or television progam pro-
claiming where and by whona product was produced. In addi-
tion, tle content of these satements made clear to the audience
that Nike's claims were in response to :olntrary factual assertions
made by Nike's critics on matters of public concern. In short,
1I is osibeon i f
11"t Nik, deeming1 the uience of sometype IofC12 ummain1 ratonl and independn,whl
ih rc utet of lllmdes otu cfh:ltctoii igh he cd deenen and olneahle
F!or! instnc be: cauise ne vspa pe r has a as trn g an~d esen t i al coneo i nie! 0dem cr!atic self-
governancethepre leases, paid ediral advertsements ad letters to the editor might he
coni dered puic disous i s in doitrstbeau s e hters (o tItan to govermnt officials) do
no la uhasr ncti n, see I') r note, 1 hel etr to the [,:illtt presidnt
:and :athliietic: d ir ector isigh't: be deemie dc eommier eia: :sp eechi But:: Sc's-:¢e N ii 2t 3S (t.) :2 554 ;:
2 565-, }(20031 (Breyer{ dissenting) descrihi g these l e tters as the least likely to atran
protecion i co b 6ncluding that they shou1d onote h e tr ated as higl piotecte sp eeh)
(eihasis reoved In aeord ith JuStice re [ ta w td l v les o a
strong clim to b , onidre par t hlicj isour than the newspape;r1' \1 1L k reae commtui
:ion s, :the leers :too :should be :deemd :to hase been :directed to :a ratiotiial:and:indeendent :acidi-:
ene engaged in a public dialogue.
:As Ju stiice B rever e-splaied with respect to the l etters to the universitY'offictal!s:
FJbletrscnetmkscertaicottit coneeruis a matter+ thiat is of; sic-
inicant nputb li ite rest anad active co6nt ro sesy an d it desc ribe s factutal m att ers re-
lated to thiat sotei t in- detail.I riular,~ii~ the l etter descibes Nikes labot ractices
awl
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consistent with the usuai presumptin about the adience of news-
paper articles and letters to the edtor it would appear that Nike's
audience consists of rtional and independent actors engaged in
denocratic dialogue, or at last no less rational and independent
than a tyial audience engaged in public diScourse.
Where, as here, inforinatioln addresSed to an audience is rele-
vant both to democratic decisiomnaking and consu1mer activity a
determination that the audience is likely to be as capable of chiti-
cally ehauating this information as it is when addressed purely
qua citizen would seem to argue for resolving the dilemma in favor
of deeming Nike's audience to be rational actor". Such an ascrip-
tion (informed in this case by a description)0o audience rationality
would almoSt certainly render unconstitutional the application 0f
California':s false adve-rtising regime to speech such as Nike 's :
As a con!sumer protection measure desi gned to regulate o rdi-
nary conmercial speech. California's false advertisin g regin con-
tailn s a nunber Of prophylacdc measu I re s appropriate to the protec-
tion ofa dependent and vulnerable audience, bu highly improper
as applied to an ascriptively independent and rational one. TIe
most egoregious example 0 1such inlappropriate overrl-otection is the
prohibition of literally true but "misleadi ng" statem enits. Under
Cali ornia's false advertising regime a "perfectly true" statement
is ationable if 'ouched in such a manner that it is likely to mis-
lead or deceive the consumer. .1h Prohibiting a literally ire
statement just because it might mislead an audience deemed to be
rational and independent wonuld seem directly at odds with tihe core
precpt that "he people in Our democracy ar e entrusted w ith the
responsibility for ju,dgin g and evallulating the relative mnemrit SOf c0n-
flicting arguments.-t"1 MakiLng mat ters wOrSe. under this reg ime a
nd riesponid to critiim o thoSe pies andSitdoesbease to iseracticex
hesh ep~ly an i,mporant rule in an existing p ublic debate. hiS debate was oIin ah ichi pa5riipants ads cated. or o0ppo0sed, pu b[ic ei lle Ctrve action.
Noe, 123 5. (. at 2566 (reer. 3, disenting) V sav e is tve of the content of all other
met hods o f cti mmniai o~in Semployed by Nike in thiS case. ,SeeKasl. 45 P.i3d 243, 24 8 (C al
2 0 0 2 ) ................
li~~~~1 M ,135 t t 6 Wr,~r J. dissenn) An mx "ons, aproper resolo
here acIborS applcatioi of th.. pli cpeech priciplei rather thn die com:erial-speec
principle. ;Consequentl!y. I otild apply a form of heightened scrutiny to the spech regtilanonsi
i questio and I believeh t t those reglat i o n sI o survive thai scet i y.")
I &a I , 4 f  orp 1 ( al -r 2d 60 ,(1a. C , App. 1998)
Frst Nal 1 Bank HJetllt 435 U.S. 76, 791 (1978). But consider linotis cx r Ma
din eiiartiig Asos . 538 S 600. 0 ( (2003) n which the Coti rejIeted a irwst
Amendment challenge to a frad msuit filed by the State of illinois againsteemarkerers accused
oft inte nio a lly mi sleadtnp co ntibuto~6rs by aftirima tis !elIy stattn Ithati a sign ifi cant i m0i no of
each doIiar donatied would bepaid  oa 6 r the ebarity or specified charitable ptre is wh , :iin
t lte e makietet  sI I kni Nht 1' cets orie of ech do lr Il e ac i tuI al o t ees cuhasty
II l th hegtee Fir AmendmeI prtcion !ilordicd charitable s oltin ii Iase suc as[;
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defendant can be found in violation merely because the statement
i likely to mislead a consumer wih no finding that anyone was
actually deceived 11' The Court' s jur-isprudswe indicates, how-
ever, that wtl re spect to statements made to an audience deemreed
rationn and independent sweeping prophyactic measures such as
those imposed by California's false advertising regime are uncon-
s At Iuional 1 8  Th us, if I there is any room for app I icatio 0o f a alse
advertisingregime to speech on matters ot public oncern, the
havin~g deem edthe raeipien ts of au ch so licilanonis to be fully ration al cils/ens en~gaged in pu bltic
discour se enc7 /emo rkennt in citc'same an s, tat itis n ot imper missgiblv >pite rnali stic ft
government 10 prot ect cies trom isla dingpoliical speeIch. While am certai that thle
Cour -would hold that the First '\mendment barred a fraud st'l ommeneed by ihe Stat o!fiiniois a gainistPl[anne d Parenthoo d for+ "miiisleadingly" staingi 1ha a ban on parial b irth abor-
tin ol nagrtehat fasgoiatnme'soe aiglate term aboioins.
vshe {in it knew that the a'ttl numbeiO ofS suc abortionas was less than %lamntsr hti
would do so for antip
that the state w0 ould be evenh~anded as between pro-lit and pri-e hoiee statements in its "~fraud"
priosecutions. Still despite th existenc of such dispoSitive pragmic objecions; I think it
quit e p os ible that the Co uouf i d find thait it is imrpe r mis sibly p aternalisi ,foKr the state iotr
to prot ' e citi zenis frrm "mislea din g" political st at ements su as t his If this is the cas t hen
R ' and it pge might be best ead as d eeming th e a-die iice tor suIh s J I ilions more
ratiotial alnd indejpendent than th pc l ae of ordinr olicttin bhtsill "d not fll ra
s int d tions bu degrees of rationai'iy in this ontext, it might '-imiatly3 distir-
gulish bet ween kfuly rtion0 al and i ndepenrdenti ci tizetis itwcled iii ptU'e publ ic d i secius+e such a
t he aborionl debat e and some ha g!aci r!ptive les s raiona i~an d de scr iptivel !more rvulabl e
c:ial information r leanto consumerI aetisty suh sth secha isti her Theosiilt
t hat theCouart vs ill. i fit h1as Snot alr ieadly, eit her e xp licitly or imrp licitly r eco0gnlii ze a spectir tim o f
au
idieerationality is one of sevalteasons thtm I tetan some doubt a to whther theConit
woiul!d fin d the applicaion ofi 0 Califoia' f i ls e adver'tisi ng r egim to* N ike' speech to v iolate t he
ce recept of citizen rationit y unidet-lying the Fi rs Amen dmenit Seel o~i sfl-o' n'ote12 4
fcndedj.
'Se ot/ro n otel 130 and ac o mp any tog te xt
Si -i g, e J, Inr Prius 4 36 3.5.] 412 178) (invalidating on First l\medment gro iundS
a stat e ban on in-person solicitationi of i iawyers a s app~liedt sol icitratio n b y an ",m- eaii Civi
li bertie si Union l-awer siit ing cli ents firpbi ieest li tiaatio0n )The Cor h nii eldtha~t
St s m ttut aly ban ordinary commerial n peron sociatins by law-
y'er "g!i n a prop hyl a ctic f'ashion"i du e to thle " potential for o venealiog with re sp ect to s oliceita-a
tosscasteoeaisuin that case that involve " poliic al express in and assoc iion," the
s tate "im ust te gulate w~ith si gitifi canty' grie ater i recision. i {Id. a4 37-3 8. C (yObrialik v. Oh io
Stat e nat4 \s'o 436 1S5 447 (19 78) (upholidi ng a hniad prophyl+actic ban onoperson sic~iita
lion as applied to solicitatiot by'0 aye ein a ter; not ii volving political expression n
associa io ).
Arguabls'. a rigorou s comirotment to the precept that die goiernment mint treat peopl!e
in ir ! capaci#t y as the iim~at ego vero rs of soc#iety as r~ationial agent s m ean s th at govemmeot i- s
categor-iceall pro +hib!ied f'rom p uishi ngi false sate ments suc Sas aNike's br +i rather mus t rust the
peo ple involved in ai pufiblic polic ebate to sorti otit Inith h orn fi s ty vvithou t its aid See sttpm'o
e++minen+t toptnish eve koin+++ ly'g m'+ +stse or misleading statements +about the me++dical nece+sity or +
in pre ss r ele ases. l ett eis to+ the ¢ e ditori pa i d e ditor+ial +ad+rtis ements 6 or+ eer+s+ to++ majo6r+ co ntr i bti
tor lust because Stich statem;ents were likely tocati se ettizeits to donat e moi-y to eitherof
agy
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sstate (o r privNate plIa intIIiff) wVoulId, at m niII iniu , h ave to sh1ow that
purchasers were actually misled by somc litemlly false state-
ment.'t~
Accordingly, I think that it is quite possible that the Court
w0uld find that application of California's false advertisi ng law to
speeh oni matte rs of Pulhic concelrn such as thoSeaissue here to
be impe rimissibly paternalisic." In addition to the general princi-
regime would be unositionlL s Ippled \OH Ntkes speech even ifI Nik ne it satmet
were taise
lindI et:itg t  he view ht te is no rom for regulation prot cting c iti I S inl ! I IiI
public discourse frm exn kn oin g lies is tbe well establishe d rinc ipl e tbat no ne ha a itstAm endmen t right to intentionall o r cxi eni reck le ssly mak e a false s tate me nt tact evn
pubic d Uisre Thus, the Fus A men dment allw tecosers 6* foi intentio6nal or rec kless mis4
statement s abouti thie off'icial conduct of puibic ot'fici]al oi for merely tiegli g ent st at etieitits a b ot
privt perPso~ns on masters fpubli concern Siia nie 155 156 arid acco mpanypngI tC e
t theeeases at not di spoiuve, for they do nIt allow speech to be punished simpl to assure
tihi peopi are not 0ilead iii fhei r cap acity as democnaic decisi on-makers. Ratlei they pelmit
the state toII prtect thoc interst i n indl! id) u al reput atCliin an in teiiest ind 1epenide nt of ero eous
deiICIat ic deciimkiig See roro tt 6. 1vei goenmen- officials h ave so me piv ate
lf ~ adm hus ) hav a legitmate:11 1intere, ditntfim any imlpact false, statementsW of factl miglht
base\ on thei omiinud tenurein offic o fu ue eletabiityi not havng teire itai ini
ihe tommunity impu g nd. I ) mor clearly pisate indis duals has e an interest in reputation
disti nct fro b pblic opino ord ti S lcsnotak in g.
f"iue probe ih application of ( aifomnias regimto Ni ke's sp is h a, it i i
bei ng misled into ormitg somef incorrect opin or, making some eroneou s decision in their
caaci tyi as the ult imate gove m ors oif soc iety It coiuld be argued tha}t the state ha a l egitimate
such lyin is srong. (r p erhaps the state has ani nsturiniiential interes Sin pr ohibitintg inten t ional
i es byg business eiieis even wih respe ct to s peech on tmatter o it b lic co n cer leste tih es e l ie
robuist and e fficient eo~nomy. As discussed i/t notet 12 howsex.er, thislatter interest does not
believingg sotin*}!g that is not tru.e
More entralls' >it may be that th an ttparern ahism principle underly~ing, the st Amen d
men dos n ot e xten d to goserument p rolumbiniti of inteniona or ! i t¢els mis statements es en in
p ublic d iscoe * beeau se i is ini eve ryboidysi: interes tiha publ ic disco*ur se does no co 0nt ain such
sttteins:.ii Ott thi S i}e, it i is fur pu rely pragm atic te as otis sucih as dllin g e ffect and sel ctive
als or a ds'ocaey o rganiZation fori~i makin~g es{en intentiotial6 orrecles m isgstatements ii highly?
onte ntiou!s pu blic debatues abou t SUc¢h m at ter~s as pai'tial birthi a botion or gu n conitr+ol i(I thank
Ronald Owrkn fo ugsigti dea tome) lndeecl it maybe that theatipaternalism
pip!le po iperly aplies otily *6to erotn o/ o12finron arid has fur ipragmatic¢ reasons dis ti!tic t
f romi th antipaterniais m p rineipie ben ext en dedito focriiol srn'iiinrs r elevitt to public debate.
lii s regard it is sigiiificant that the urt it~ itaver expresslY held that ilie fiist Amendment
antipaternalisin pi ncipl ta pplies to govrent p rh i bition of tals !s t aenient of fltsa S iee in/ru
no0tel 123. Althouagh t am ltr the reason stat ed in thisi te confideniit that the Cour wtoul aId i n-
validate. as applieditospeeeh6 ot imatters ot public concerni afal se advert{ising r:egim~eth~at
b anne d iterall true though* m isleading State m e itt i am not certain whetheiVr iwit old dii si for
ant-iparteriialistic r~eaciis r ath~erithan fur pragitiatic r~easotis related topiper infurmatioti tt osv
{ee ile' i23. (t. at 2566{B rerei dissesiti) (doubting stas us of ulte privt aittr
ney ge ner~al priion can su rvive the ' height ened I Firi{ '\me nidne ntl ~ secttoy' warran te d by
the "fo>rmatco ntent and ~eguto~!ry context"7 of N ike' speeh).
ii P rofesor Un akeri beliexs t{hat the Cali fotnia re guliation is not p aternalistic because the
st atie's con ein in' a p plitig it s 'al se adve ri sing t'egim' e to sp eech on maitt ers of pblile cunn
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pies just discussed, ixo specific strands of precede support this
conclusion. First, the Court has stated that where "the component
pats of a single speech are inemxricably iuertnwined w ap y
our tes for fuill protected expression."' 2 2 Additionally the Court
byt buIns ente isIthtInterit of I discourse II \hlih pe'ople: develop ''\eIrw
views on the basis o 0di alogue wih other inditi d aa ls" Bkeii sup ra note rt, at 11 Thus in
lits 4ie he stat ha impoed astict cnition of acuracy on speech by bu siness entities
engaged in public discoure t e e p t hse e it ies frota distt[in g t he (constit ut io naly po
who s ng~ht s are beinig infringedi it isilegitim fo~lr the st at e to strmiit're puth i c discou rse o as
to prevent "!distortion f t he debate Thle anaswier to this question d epetids ot prWecisely vsliyth~e
state wants to preentsuchdistortion. In light of t'he focus o n se ii otisleading tt:em-Iens
t he/most obvriou explanatio is that state pirpoe w ai keep thepariipa from bteig m ise dI'T I I ma Ing some w e po'!Itica al dtn. Ii is11 ieth reaso fur1 preenin the! Is
tori,11 the\ '1 tat h s Pt!rpos :! I ou Id seem I i ,ittrmissilypamernlsi I t II IT tru ta in uh lig
ban on the use of cimrpotate reasi' f ,und to spport r o ppos acandidate fo r state offie, the
Court i i4's!in 494 U.S at 66 h)9 0 0 ilid on the state's interest in av iding 'the coI'Sive
anist'I;Iolin effect of mmoeisse agrgion, ofI i xcll that 1 ar ,I acmlatefd wit the1ff, helpj ot,
Ihe corp raeI fr m) anld that have li ttle or no corelatin ti the pu ic's suppot II Ithe coIrIpofa-
tion splitiei i1de1 Bt nit interet in keping corPora'ti roi usiti'g 'koU r rce ama inl
the eonom ic m arketPlace tobta in an un fair a dvantiage in t he poli tical markcetpl ace,"U.a 659
(inter ,nal quot aion m ark s cite, ci vt aion omittd is cliff ercit fro m the p ater ia!i sti e inr,e st ii
cal I Id eni.
Riley. Na'l lednof te lind ofN.C., c. 48715 '81, 7.6 (198 8t fhoroiills
combin pri!vate econiomic elements and mattes o pub~ic conccm fill eo,itt ion~al piotec-
tion. Atissue in Thon/ill vs as theproseution of a labor picketer under a statcl statue tha
pro h ibited0 a nyonte fro6m approac h ing the premises of a~ bts inesgs *' with thei ntent of influenc ingg
or induceing olier pesons not to rad wob, buy front, sel to, have businesses deaing wih, or
be eiployed by 1" such b usin esses. Iat 01. The 'Uit ackno wledged that the purpose ,f the
abo p icket ing atiue was "Io adi Se cust omers and pioSpeive I  I tomerI of the Iabr d :Is-
pute a!d lte !r t induc sIu custiterS nt to patronize themployer, U Ia ,9, and that
the pri}se of a lbr piekeicirat the site of bu sinesses ':may persu ade sorme of those-reached
I refrait fro1 entriitg n1 t o a I advaiitageoII s reat 1its w ih I Ie !btisiits st sabtishIchmnt" Id. at
I(14 lti the Coon also recogi/ed that "labor ilati are not m att ers o ne r  I  a or nveIIi I
con ernII 'itiMt[ie dis t sIIn coieriing th'e: odit in its indu stry and the caus o I
labsr di pure ap@pears to ci! indi spensable to the effe tive and intellige nt us of'the procsscs of
popular go1eri ent to shape 11 t desiny' oI it ind u stia I soce .I at 10 espIte!te
fctI that Suc pi ii disc uomu was thU niertw ined i Ith pureiy private economic activity t he
Cout neixe-heless found the statute " invalid on its lace." Idat 101.
;'oio in ( o/fi , 23 1 : "5. l (6 (19)45) 1 1 1mmla;rly itld labo spec tha combi
ietit s of debate tin matters of public conce and o-dinary business ) iatter speci fi I ally a
speel b y a labo le~i ade ri that con taitted S pei~fic s o[i itattits to out a6 tioni In6 holdin g th e
claim ta1 it Ioud eoit-st itU oiial rLt egult e 1b1tsiits, practices, StlIlit a selli ng iuance,
deal in g ii se riies a ting as om m io n m e l F" ta paxxitbroloa It e Ud a I26. I I e ti t I
further acn t I edge d that beca use the speeh ha iCssu cn t ained i nt t i i .. b oth gene r al
ativrtx'." Id a 531. Howcver1 because s ch busi ess elements wcre "inscparadI N i it of
the speech Id at 5 34 th Court afforded theen-tire speechite fll prottio o! f the FirstI 'dmen d at 537. 1h ac crdly ltel 'Ield t a stat law rcuiri ng paid utio1 organiz ers to
reiseI with the st ate b )e1f re 'sliig" pe ple to I i n th t n Io e1tild ioIt appli e d t his
speechi . a 540 , a/so NA, ( PA . ( laiborn arare fo., 48 1.. AM 3 1 82)
(holding that the co nni e boyc o m IIercCha t s ina suppot of an tfdeo ogi eal goal shotild be
tieaicclas higihly piot eted public discotirise the Court fstar a "iihi:l ! St atev have bro0ad
agy
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has found paternalistic rationales impermi ssible even w ith respect
to eOgulation of ordinmry commercial speech having at best a tenu
ous connection to dwmocamic self-governance. in any event a
finding that the California regime is unconstitutiOnal as appied to
Nike'S allegedly misleading statements because it fails t0 respect
the r itionmlity of the audience to whom Nike directed its state-
ments is, inm view the result that best accords with the values
underlying the Court's free speech urisprudence. In the final
analysis, however, \ whether app ication o( f Cali fornia's legal regime
to Nike's speech is, in principle, inconsistent with the First
Amlendme nt is an eXt-emely difficIlt (que stion about which I retain
some doubt, I wll therefore go on to inquire whether. on the
powr to rgulate eco no"mic acivJI ie do ot ftind a omiparaile right to prohibit pa l fi
po i i l acIti viy I t as t t a ou nd in the yc ttin this case") Murdo v. Pn n Itl an ia. 319
(2.S.10 106(1943 (holdin that an rdinane reqsrig that all perSo solii ting
order for gd or merhan dise of an' k i nd o btI a lien -se canno t e onstituti olml
applied t( hiiivahs Witn es s eIn gaged in selling reLigio s bo k dI p amphlets) (. B og er
ol Y sing rg Prod". Corp 46 U 6 67-68 (1 ) (staing that ti a se aker eombine
fulkl' plowecid publi disourse aId ordi nary Im elrcial spech il acotnext in wthich th ese
elemntns coulid be easily be separated, the speech 8is iitled to onlydi e leisseir protection pro-
vided commercial gpech)
&e , Va. Stat d of him. vVa ('iiens eon  ou cii a 5 74N . 70
I 1976) (conideminig as iihighly+ p ate rnalistic' thle states arg im ent that custome will choosteh
ou o- ha', d lo ca l, pmccalsl , and drv pof s~onal" pharacie outof unes CS nix (st ate t h at "i l]t is priecisely t his ki nd of choice, bet wee n thie dai g es of su p pie Sing
infomatioI an dh angersof is misu i' its freely avail ale, !atth irs ndmen
mak~es (or} uis") [o mpson S . Vs. States I'ed. CtVr.. t 1..5 . 35 35-l74 012)( We hia previ-
trsib fcil oM mercial inf 11rmatI in o r to preet members of he ptli'c from makinmg had
decis ions itl he infor iss~anon ;see a lsoi44 1 iqarmartr Ilnti,. Rode IAMhitc 517 3..t 484.
503 (199 6) (opinio f Stevens ., joined by Keed and Gisburdg. . 1 ("The First Amnd-
meati directsu tgo be espcciajy skepti!calof teguaiins thigiat sc'ek to keppoPle at th dark< for
It i true that in the orinary co mmerial speec eases the{ C 11 haS applied tis u st1rng an-
uipatrnalis principleP! only tvitl shrespect to regula tion of speeds that )i ne!ither false nor misl 1ead-
ing hl t as Ro beP t P)st h -arguedthe Court's faiure t ext:end Fii's Amendmest pr0tection to
false id misleadin sisiiseis seems i iso is scist it ith the exten o die ant ipai e r , al sm
principie to commerialspeech Se tcPi s' t no e 67, at .37. heraI el, it s faiIure t
extend this iat emalim principe to is logical c) nlusion may ief lcciit that it ras erolr r hlie
Court to 1sase applied this principl toordinary commercialspech its ise first place. But irs
either eenli the (ouri t's fil re lo extetd t He ant ipaternai principle tohe rglat , i1 of o;i-
saty commercial s peeh in way ti ndlee us the point ta the cur rent Cou e eris pari enlaily
h0sile to patiaitic iusificaions for regulaion oilf spech.
i~~~ ~~ 'Iil Ia faryci'a ii that its th sisc of somc degree csf immisiyfo niunten-
isoisall fae sateents the ( Ot' woU ld prohibit he appli a tionof' califor ', regi t
speech i matters of' pub lic "icern scili as Nik I 's amai no as s:t thai it would do on
atpai'alism gr on tds 1s opp to the prag ii: con crns abotit infolrsation flo discussed
i Par l1, i nfi. I additiot to se reasons notcd s,'oa Wno1te' 11 atsd 119 1 reraits some i1 -ge-,i isg doubt tiat there maiyexist somie e giti issate statei intet ine reg ulatirig all i asc or mi sle a d-
in g statement he husbinc s e niies tha coul dinfl u ee consu mer, beh av! is, incl !ud4in g stVat enent s
inextriceably li ned w ith m atters o}f pcibltc cer n iatm is a isalyticeally d istinct t'rom assuroing that
theaudieneusiot iscsiled 1toforniig oin false belief on i m laer of; pubji en or in
engagi cin ri olus demo raic deci i o nmakig. I rinst a ce, i cou ld be argi ed that bec a use
coommer coist'i dene is vitati ais ef iciei anI d robust eco isomy the state has a legiti ime ti ter-
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assumption that the applicaion of Calfornis las Nike's
speech does not viOlat some core norm, it nonetheless unconsitu-
tionally impinges the important secondar value of assuring that
government does not warp or unduly impede in formation needed
for deiocratic self-governance.
B. Application olcahjbria 's Legal Regime to ;Nike I Speech
Vioates an Importnt Secondar Free Seech Norin hy
Unduly Reatricing and Distoirting Injrina(ion
Needed De m ocratic Decisio lma kinlg
Even if California's false advertising regire does not violate
the basic precept that the government mUst treat us as rational
agents when dealing wit us in our- capacity ais citizens, it nionethec-
less has the potential to threaten the proper functioniong f d emoc-
racy by limiting info rmaiion neaeded by the peopl for making cor-
rect public policy decision,S. The record in thi S case shows that,
after this suit was filed, Nike esseOtially stopped telling its side of
the storyin the Public media, Fi Even if it is assumed thaI Kasky's
allegations are correct and Nike's information campaign contains
various false or misleading statements Snot even Nike's severest
critics contend that every stat e m e nt iln Nike's campaign was false
Or miSleading. Thus N ike s deciSio n not to speak out Of fear Of
incurring liability deprived the Public of potentially useful infor-
mIation nIlon only to Nike, or even i f known to others, that oly
N ike would have been w ing to incur the expense of bringing to
the public's att ention. As Justice Stevens explained: "Knowledge-
able persons should be free to participate in [debate about impor-
tant publc isSUes] without fear f unfai repris t S
t is bad enough that the public is robbed of Nike's pe rspec-
tive on the diSpute aboUt w0king conditions in its overseas facto-
ries. This damage to the public dialog ue on matters o f public Col-
ern is. however, far more extens iv. If Califolrnia's legal regime
is applied to speech on Fatters of public Concern without meaning-
fu First Amendment constraints, the public will be deprived of
em in prohbitin false statements by bnsinS! is i"respet of the power of these !!f Ie
,gtatemeiS to misjead c eo rs J i isnot clar however, tha this intere s reaalx distinc t
from Ihe merest it preventing spe1 ch fm m sleadi n g cosus WhS eSe woolc 1 cnmers
lo s e onfidec in bus ines en t iti es do*e to thir! m isstatem~ents o the than th e fact thatthey we re
m iled int believing Sometin g t hat waS not tine? leasie open howe , the possi bility that
the Court mightfin d a r1ationak' 1ucli as is su.ffiently distin1t fiom assuing t{ha people are
nu i* into ! b eieving or in g soimethinin th{ei cu e capacit, or thaI have overioiiked
some tither non patemalistie sti fi eron for the appliation ol Caliom ias regime to NikeS
s p e e c h ....................... ..........
>8cce soproi note 8 and aecompany n~ tg ext
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useful information on anl 'umbe o matters of vital public inter-
est. To avoid liability, businesses ithin California's reglulator y
juri:sdiction will be deterred from makfing an:y factual assertions
relevant to their produt or operations, or anything els"e for that
matter, that a socially conscious consumer might reasonably con-
sider. even w\hen these statements ar pertinent to some important
issue of public concern, As Justice Breyer pointed out: "Numer-
ous mmii including some wo do not belie \ e that Nike has fully
and accuirately explained its labor practices argue that [the Cali-
fornia regulatory scheme] will 'chill' speech and thereby limit the
supply of relevant informaion available to those, such as journIl-
ists, who seek to keep the public in formed ab out important public
issues,
It is no answer that businesses in Nike's situation can avoid
liability simply by making sure that the statements, which will al-
most always be about matters which they can verify, ar e accurate.
Fo on e, the prohibition applie s not _just to false statements b ut to
misleading ones as well. h k much more difficult for a speaker to
judge w her a literally true statement, particularly one that is
also relevant to a highly charged public policy debate, mighit none-
theless mislead a consumer than it is for i ti determine whther
the statement is litemlly true. Moreover, even with the execise of
utmost care, it is difficult for a large organizaon to always be me-
ticulously accurate even with respect to factual statements about
i operations. But under the strict liability possibly imposed by
section 17200, even completely innocent factual errors he
actionable.29  Flnal a highly charge d political conte xt, there
is reasmo to doubt whether only false statements will be punished.
ESpecially where there is uncertainty about the facts, the fact
SId. at 2568.
'- As Justie eyeirI li n'ed: " lage Owgami)ats ns unq ualifi" ed claim abut th IdI
quac 3 of worini g condieuon i.ould!d l to habd!ity S!hou!da cou rt conclu de afterrhearing the
e i de nc t hatea l enoe eepttons ex it sto warrant quiabication niieve n if thosl0g ~e xcpions g we
unknossai to the s peaker"fr.a 2567.i wa soiiewha re~ dffic ult for iketo o0bt ain the
Atsa bout w orki on s in thi case, because Nike di d not act own the ihetorics at
issue but contrs'ted with local businesses fhor tois lm bo Sle Kand 45P.3d 243 247
State I larm IJe& as (0 Su3peior C 53 idal Rpr.d 229. 233 (-al (I \pp.
l') O) ("The statute impoS stt liabi ity.) contrast. ( . 13:S &F h ()E 1Th00(Wesgt 20t0). appie to gsateme nts w hich arte "'knon r w hich by the exer cise ot re1 a sonable
cae hold be know, to beunO or mledn. pprnlit has' nesr bendeie
whet her the Scieit~et reclirc'id by Section 1750 0 caries ov)et by implicatioti to false a dvertisitig
actions broughtunder MAl. Bt S & PROF. OF 17200 (West 2070 t is tine that Kasky's
om plati a leged that Nike made the alle edly alse a misleading tatements becas of
their liec ndaesns.KA'',45.d23 4 'Ihas Nike was "' r ot ue a stict
lib iit5 thetit howc'ci, doesg n~it mean that other ctsinesses engaged n a pulic debae inih
So t b. ............. ............ ..........
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finder's judgment may be influenced by his or her ideological
views.There are, moreover, several features of the California legal
regime that magnify its power to deprive the public of information
critical t democratic self-goverance. First, liablity may attach
even if no one actually relied0n tie allegedly false or misleading
statements. In addition, severe penalties, including disgorge-
ment of money acquired as a result of the unla ful conduct, ana, ; , 131
injunction against any further v ioations, as well as a court SU-
perVised campaign of correctivec advertisin,2' g cml b! imposed for
violation of these laws. The California Supreme Court has thus
held that this legal regime should. be given i"t full deterrent force"
to dissuade "the defendant, and similar entities, from engaging in
such practices in the future, 1  Such potent deterrence may well
be justified with respect to oinnary commercial speech unalloyed
with a debate on matters of public concern.i With regard to
purely commercia speech, an lo s of Potentially useful consumer
information chilled or -corrected" by these laws is arguably more
than offset b the prevention of consumer deception. With respect
to speech that is i wicabl lined to a ontentious policy debate
in contrast. Such strolng 7 deterrence threalens to doubly distort tle
public debate on controversial matters. Not only does the avail-
abilit Yof these remeieS d eter b u sinesses froi participating in tie
debate, and thereby from sulpplying'_ useful fin formationl, but thle
public discussion will, inl addition, be further slanted in one diree-
tion if businesses who do risk participating in the discussion are
odMerd to engage in corrective" advertising.
Finally, thi s deleterio cus ctfie Oln pUblic discourse is greatly
exacerbated by the ability of any California citizen to enforce this
powerful legal regime acting as a "private attorney general" 1 35
oAhough gvrnment offcils can abuse legal regimes such as
California's false advertising laws for ideological reasonS, variou S
lCgal and practical checks . I . tend to keep the nergies Of public
enforcement agencies focused upon more purely economic
harm:""3 The private attorney general provision, in contrast, posi-
tive invites "a purely ide0lgical plaintiff, convinced that his
' See Bak o< Othe \vest- ,. Supenr (,'out 833 P.2d 4 55 3 (d 1992).
Ie (Al Y35 ( It .0, 17203 (MeY 997) bank q/h M~, U 833 P 2d
S~~~:~ Sta, ['r ir (a., 53 ( al. Rpt. 2da1i 235.
L See Ct an, m non! x. Sltaf)cna Ce0fe ' ,d a Rptr' 2i 193 108 (Cal. CI.1
Q0. 92).
tIether. Se_ Pa.Natl Bank. ,1 P205d , >Ca-7 (( d '7v)
e i(-on ,taaee, Un ionM 6 (Ca. Rptr 2d I 3 [et h0r, )591 d 51
ssee (0 1~H . & IRot ( 0 4 ( \72\0 , Iest 97)
'-' ,ikr 123 S. ka 57(ryr mehn)
agy
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opponent is not telling the truth I about some matter of public conl-
ccrn], to bring into thle Courtroom thc kind of political battle better
waged in other forumlls. "- The usual requirement in civil litiga-
tion that a private plaintiff must be able to pro've that she has in
fAct been damaged by the wrong ful conduct ill serve as a practi-
cal constraint against ide 1ological misuse of potent lega lregi mes
such as the one under consideration here Without such a require-
men however, there is little to constrain widespread abuseof su ch
legal machinery or its rel potemial to delprive the public ofr ital
in formation On mat ters ofpublic concern.
Mor eover, the ideological misuse of California's anti-false
advertising regime through the private attorney general provision
will do more than just limit the amount of information available to
tIe public t0 form judgments on policy issues. Even more debil-
t ating to tie proper fufnctionig of de mocratic self-goverance,
su ChIa \ s i t il l select iely s I anIt in formation aailable to the
public. Under current doctrine, the First Amendment pro\ides po-
litical activists rigorous protection against lawsuits based on any
false or misleading statemens they may make about a business'
labor practices. But, when, as happened in this case, a busin e s
responds to these charges, it is subject to the ful rigors of Califor-
nia' s anti-false advertis ing legal regime w ith according to the
Californlia Sup reme CoUt, no First Amendment immuIn ity for false
or misleading statements Such an uneven playing field threatens
to warp public policy debate in two different ways. First, it will
stifle information on just one side of a particular dispute, a
Kasky's lawsuit has dnoe here. ut more generally, such lawsuits
\it L in tle aggregate, tend to privilege those who fav rNor more rgu-
lation of businesses and economic affhirs as opposed to those who
favor more business friendly policies, an ideological division that
roughly marks the divide between liberals and conservatives in this
Country, r indeed, between Democrats anld Republicans.
It is one thing for the progressive frtces in society to use lie
democratic process to obtain tough consumer proteetiol laws such
as the false advertising regime at issue here, or to condemn and
even oycott domesticbusineses who, in their view, exploit over-
! 1 as itf app aren tly do es; the e l it'; irne ' ni ali ce?' stan~dard applie s to pro duct dis
paragenent suits by hsin(,e aant con Tsu mer grip, t henthis lvelo protectin sho uld
ako be6 aailable to p oitic al spe ech of ix idtual eitiicns th-at oan fa s e ibtual stat emieis
(194 t (assuming with~o t~ deIdi at the m alice s adard applies to such a e sI; sl u k i Mo-
Inc. s. Clak. 78 (al Rp t-r d 2 Cl C ri , Iapp 1 8 (pply inll, g tihe malie 0saidard to pirl odudispar~agem~ent stilt).
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seas wvorkers or rob American wAorkers of wAell paying Jobs. IDe-
priving the pulic of information needed to make judgments on
these mattcrs, however, subv-erts democracy.
Earlier I argued tha ideooi0cal uSe of (aliforna's false ad-
v'ert isi ng regime by privatecitizen s should not be attributed to the
state. The viewpoint discrimination I -just described thus should
not be considered a breach of the core democratic norm forbidding
the siat fron fiavoring one side in an ideological battle. But A
tho1ugh not a violationof his core norm because its impetus comes
fron a private party, such iiewpoint discrimination nonethele. ss
results from use ofa state regulatory reg ime n a way that is inimi-
Cal to the proper functioning of.democrac.. Not only does Such
ideological miSUSe Of a powerful regulatory device warp informa-
tion available to the ciizenry on matters of public concern, it also
tends to fra Ythe comm itnient to fair play and Self-restraint upon
which free and democrattic societies ultimately depend.
I11. DETE R MINING THE PROPER LEVEL OF FIRS'
AMENDMENT PRO TEC(TiON FOR NiKEs SP EECH
If, as 1 have suggested i does, application of (aliforna's
fals1e advertising regime to Nike's speech violates the core precept
0f citizen raionalihty underlyin(g the Firt Amendment, then it can
have no application to such speech. A much more difficult ques-
tion is what limitations, if any, the First Amendment imposes upon
the operation of Is regimeif s application to this speech does
not violate a core norm, and thus is not in principle contrary to the
First Amendment, but nonetheless impairs the important secondary
value of assuring that government regulatkon does not disort or
unduly impede the information flo\w needed for democratic delib-
eration. Led astray by the formalism that works well in routine
free speech cases, the C alitfo111a Supreme Court c oncluded that to
the exten it was false or misleadi ng, Ni ke speech was entitled to
no First Amendment protection. As we have just seen, h0wever, if
left unrestrained by the First Amendment, application of Califor-
nia's legal regime to Nike's alleged faCtual misstatements threat-
ens to rob the public of valuable information on matters of public
concern and to do so in a viewp\oint-o)r iented way.
LO:ast In dotrinial terni~S, ky'S !ioking (:adoi'i legal e ieime to restra in Nikc'i
speech suappieth ,-4e, action mainltg the First .\rndmnt a pplieable: See Y limes to j. v
Snulis an.32 u7 .s. 25 2o 6 ( 1904t )statiing th at a pisate ~i b el 500i invoik ing a siraie d etaomgion
las wi a st ate act!in tr iggeing!; ! rt A!mendintP prot ecton). No > ver. becaus t he i mpti t* ora
consader~ed de facto i ather+ th de jutie di,.sninih~ianon.
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Unlik the California Supreme Court's highly tbrmalistic
conclusion that Nike's allegedly false and misleading statements
are entitled to no Firta Amendment protection, Professor Baker
focuses on perinent fre speech values to make an interesting ar-
gunent that despite such possile stifling and dist ortion o infor-
mation, a pplication of California's regime to speech on matters of
public concern should nonetheless be left unconstrained by the
First Aiendment. As do I Profe ssor Baker believes that ordinary
business entities have no First Amendment right to participate in
public discourse. But Contrary to my vCew (but conSistent w ith
the one I adopt for the sake of argument in this pat of the artice),
he also finds that application of Calitbrnia's regime to Nike's
speech is not impermissibly pateralistic and thus does not violate
the core audience right protected by the First Amnendin)i 4 1 Ac-
cordin gly, in Baker's view the onlyi free speech values at stake in
this case are various instrumental intere"sIS) 2 Given these prem-
ises, Baker concludes that the sta e's interest in protecting "the
itgiyOf' a, discour-se in which people deCvelop their ownl views
on the bais of dialogue with other indiViduals" is a constitution-
ally sufficient reason to exclude busineiss entities all together, and
thus a fortiOri sufficient to hold themto stfrict standards Of1ruth-
fulness. lest these entities -distort[] Ithe (constitutionally protected
and valued) dialogue" Baker admits that such exclusion "might
produce bad co nse qu enices" but ilnsi S that eValuati onS of this type
of trade-off is the normal task of legislative bodWis.-" 4
I generally agree with Professor Baker's v iew that where only
instrumental Concerns as opposed to core, individual First
Amendment rights are at stake, the balancing of such social policy
matters should in a democracy beleft to the legislature. Thus I
have previously written that, contrary to the views of several
prominent legal acade mics, the judiciary properly has only an ex-
tremely limited role in assuring that speech regulations Such as
intellctual property laws do not impair the diversity of, oices in
the marketplace of ideasi4  This limited judicial role in assuring a
robust, diverS marketplace of ideas derives from the observation,
dealed above, 46 that the marketplace of ideas is but a periheral
concern of the First Amendment. But wlile I am in nearly con-
340 Baker, Oupyr? not e 65.
"] d. at ii174.
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plte agreemet with Baker With respect to the proper judicial role
in assuring proper information flow in g enr 4  we part coniay
when it comes to assuring informnation needed for democvratiic dec A
sion maAng. Although this concern may be oily insiriumental and
thus not truly an individual rig ht, and for this rea SOn not a core
First Amendment value, it is, nevertheless, an important secondary
SAlue and One that the judiciary has had t 8 and in my view, should
continue to have, a crucial role in protecting. Unlikc thc authority
fotr blancing genral welfare concerns related to information flow,
assuring tle proper flo of iniormation needed for democratic dei-
cisionmaking is not a matter over wich the legislature can be
Safely gI ven u nre Vi ew ab e disco! Thoret u g h t he instumental
nature of this concem, and hence the propriety of balancing it
against other social wefahre maitters argues fot a restained judicial
role in this area this consideration does not, as Baker contends,
require complete judicial abdication.
There is, of course, no bright line between information needed
for ordinary social welfarereasons and that required for democ-
i flie small area of. disagr eieent here is tha t 1,see some roon tot a, very li mited :judiceial
rol e ini prti etin g t he nar ketplace o6 t deas et apar ifrom itis coeton to pobics wher~e
Baker apparot hnks t! here shul hUeb no icia vers *ight oh!~ respe to thisg norm But ou
disagreement Ima he more apprent than Irea, for as a nrmati ve mtter am open t peI t ston
t Jat in th Iah C e o f anl impact Io 11fornat1on n1 1 1 ded fo r detIo Irat i Sel' 1)g ovcman Ithj vtdicia rv s houl !not us thV[e Fi tue ndment to! inv alidate csen reg ulatio*n thait have pate nt
enous, and u ifed 1' n for the m o( i I ut as a ip-
inc maeIrit woud apar that uider current doctrine the ju d ciay retai nms ome limit ed roie in
fbnmaioi flo sch as scient ifc daa i e1 supro no 7 7 and!c o mpaYing text
!e sti proi note 75 and ac i mp anyiIg text Firs Nul Bonk Beorti, 4i5 US. 765,
71 8(108 (invalidaing oi f!i A n t giids a state ian a I w g I ! ith iited e ep
io I dIa l i rote s onLt,' 6 any 1matter suhi itied to the otte")I is peIaps the clearest exa m-
with Irs iedmn rhI at, stake.- Whil 'A vn i . hch. : "ioih f (ooioirsce,, 494I .S
652(19Th uphldngahnon the use'i of1 coprt tesr unsi pport of. or in1po1
speitic holdi ng, the Inorn~i i a (nun insistence tat the regulatio Wa n arrovxsl\ tailiired t
achieve a compelli ng state interest,see id at 660- shows that the (nur desi re s lie 'dtcar
t cont iufe to play a role ili asit that l it do undympede inforation eeded
foir democratic decisiomaking.
............ I he topic o f the priope-r u d icial tol e in protectin h ihria~i}t ion floss iteeded for+ de-
moc r atic1 sl govrnance i a arge d im po rt ant tpic that cannt h adequa a ddr e s e
he-r. Su1ffictt ayihathee at a least two easons th mandate a!t ilast scm iu dicia
oversight t laws tha t impair suc h information flow. ist. bec ause witdeopetuintformation ot.'1ow,
aho issues of matter o puhlico ncern will fthe W a threat to the stats u. the o r dinarypolitical procSes aitito her tustd exto prot ec Cthis v ital chec k on politic al abu~se or malfe~asance o r
ent renhe d scial or e o n (mi ini t! re In a dditi on, ju dIgt e  arde a rguah mo re co mpett tha I
aI e gi slators to aciiratey appraise the fect f law s rest ricting ii fo mati oI on ite pro pe
unctioing oif the democr atic proce S S. But r egardles o f whet her th!ae jutdiciaryi shouild police
legisl ati decilsio thati nhiit r w aip stici ntbrL 0nt ! ao flow, thr is n doubt that 1 tde
curret ir A~! men dment d octinei cou ttS doiM hav the authity iS to tivia te laws th at undy
interfere wiit formlaion eeded fo r deoociai deMi snioinaking. ee p hote i75 an ac-
co hpanyitt ig text.
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ratic decisiounnmaking.i But wherever that line might be reasona-
bl y drawn, [i]n the circumstance of our times the dissenmit no of'
in formation concerning the facts of Nikes overss labor policies
must be regardecd as nformation neeed or appropriate to en-
able the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
Period.- S we hav e see n, appl ication of California's false ad-
vertising regime to speech Such as withOUt any First
Amendment Constrait, is likely to deprive citiensof information
neediedd or appropriate" for dem ocr at ic docis ionmnaking as well as
ideologically distIor the availabl informationi'2  The California
Sup eme C wu as thereforAe quite wrong to hold that Nike' s al-
legedly fails or misleading statements were entitled to no First
Amendment protection.
But that still leaves us with the ques"tion of' precisely how\\
much Firt Amendment protection this speech should be affordied.
Having firmly rejeced t he o ption ofno protection, e nquickl
rule out the opposite exIreme of absolute immunty or speech such
as Nike's. 3 An individual engaged in debate on a matter of pub-
lic concern would not be enitled to absolute immunity for fase
factual statements made about a business entity. Rather, such a
critic would m iost kely b e liable r defa ma io or product dispar-
ageent if the business cold show that the statenent was made
with knowledge that the statement was se or twit h conscious dis-
regard for hether it was true or nOtI 4  It would. therefore, be
anomalous to provid a business entity like Nike with greater pro-
tection than an indiv idual who, unlike an ordinary business ntiiy,
has core First Amendment participaory interests that can, in the
absence of adequate immu nity be impaire d by de famation laws
and the like. W e are therefmoe left with basically two possibilities:
(1) extremely strong protection such as provided by the New Yk
!O %Sec ipru note 82
1scrnitll ,, Aabama,1 US Si . 10 i(194
1) 1 a Pe wt ro f Baker t hatl -[d isortijon, oI cr,e has no naturali meaing"n
that ptiblte debate in ou oirety is "di storted" because "he poor have les0 rees ti parii-
pat thi an the r~ib.Baker. sr note 47.o B7ut the di sto rtion to wih t he tirsi anenen iiit
is s ensitiveis the ideologic al wa rptng of tn forntatitofloss eaui ed 5us gro* eminent regutioni ofpl ication leg ,l d toio!
pei sch a a o f califo ia's egimet oN ies tat emens not distoio0
result~ing front spec i neutral lao orocies, anmd str ly not from socal conditions (o lackJ otf
radically redis tri but-ie eonomic ipoicies gamelorating these conditions. Whetihe i irIt
Aenment- ji od he l sesitie t !s ,0dee per eaue o istortio n i anotheri quest ion ellb eyo nd the scp of this ar*tice. Su fftce it to sa y, extendi ng the First Ame ndmne nt to m iandate
re medie fbr such storii w ouild involl the td iiary in social policy decisions t" removed
fro'm : the ecti of indvdu ght a jtctal role thIat boh Profess or Bl aker and i seem
agree wvould be vry roblematic.I I h a is for the sake f argument as do in this part o the a t icle that ap pica
tion of ihe a i tor ;a gimeto Nik,' s pevclusk nt infringe ancore fr)ee s pe cha e s
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Times "malice" standard; or (2) more moderate protection, such
as applied in Ger-tz v,. Robert Welch, Mnc.ltC I believe that this
lesser degree of immunity is the appropriate standard.
No one has a First Amendment right to make a false statement
0 fact e ven w hile participat ing in pubIic diSco ur se. I o we er
lest speakers be undWly detered by govmnment regulation from
participating in this discourse in violation of a core norm of par-
ticipatory democr acy the First Amendment provides prophylaxis
for this core norm by allowing speakerS limited inmuiity fromt
pu ishment for making su fa se statements. As discusSd above,
Nike is neither an entity protected by the core equaity precept of
participatory dem ocracy, nor one capable o f being engendered
with the sense of the l egal System's legitimacy that such part Cipa
tion pioduces15  Accordingly, no level of First Amendment im-
nU nity, let aloi tihe "nialice" staidard, is warranted to 1pr0t ect
Nike's participatory rig*hts
The conclusion that Nike is not constituti0nally entitled qua
sp eaker to the protection of tihe "malice st an dard" (ofr any immuv
nity for that matter) does not mean, however, that such rigorous
protection of Nike':s speech is not needed as an inStrmental imatter
to insure tat people are supplied w ith information needed to ori
sound public policy j udgm7 nts. The criteria for determining as a
Fi rst Amendment Policy mUer What level 0 f protect ion is jU sti fied
are, however' very different from those applied in determining tihe
level of protection warranted to protect ia true individal right For
if a person hilas  right, in tihe strorfng sense of tle term, to certain
treatment by governmer, then the  overnment may not deprive
him of that right basedon so meultilitarian calculus that society
would be better off if tihe right were violated. Thus if a certain de
m It nld tha t o" fl o 'I rce dg of shhe I " as fl[ or not).
-,(terta-,v Robert \Vefl-h... 418 U S 33. 347 3490(1 tating th- at th e I IsI
nndmert fob)dS i mpoSitin o liability in adefamatik suit brou ghty h aprivati.e peri son
re gar~duig false st ate ments on a matter~i of puibl! ic cr w itht a finding o f Thult and actuial
1" flits foloM' s iom th~e thu that onliy qu aliied ratheri than- a bsolu te i mmuty was pin-
vided b y So l in'on an ir 'elz Se s up rao tes I i 5 -56 ;see (i/, to Geir: 4 18 U: S at 340 (l The re
is noconstituional vailue in lsatement o t. Neither theinte nt ional lie nor the careless
error m' ate r ialls advan es socsietssg inters in ~ininheib ite d iro b ust, an d wide -o pen debateo
at he cor ide mocr atic pre cep thutt the go0v e rnent mtis treath liten ers i t cizeihi
capac it as ratio na a ge ntS arguagbly p uts considerable Firt Amienidmient constraints on he abil
i ty oli the goiv ernment to iprotec tidiences senigaged i n pu blic discoe I rom be i ngi misled by
f~als e sta temen ts. gs myra note s 04,1 l(, 11*9 a nd ac om p a nyin gtext.
i5 see suproi notes 91-3 an daccompanyin g text.
0 t Sce sproa n'otes9li-93 and~q accompanyinhg t~ext.
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gree of immunity were needed to assure that application of CaO-
fornia's, regulatory regime did not effectively barn a speaker with
participatory rights from engaging i public discourse on equal
terms with other speakers, ' then it would be improper to weigh
this right to speak against testa te s interest in protecti .n g con sum-
ers froin bein misled. In other words, a right in this sense acts as
a "trump" on even such important state interests as consumer pro-
tectionil t  Similarly, even tile fear that the people would make
some disastrous social poliMy decision if informai 6on was not kept
secret Could not justi fy restriction on such inlformation62i
In contrast, precisely because the claim that information is
needed to allow people to make wise policy choices is not based
on an indiVidual ri ght, Su Ch utilitarian balancing 0f interests iv
pernissible. If he Speech interest at issu e is not truly an indiv id-
ual right, but merely a particularly important aspect of the public
interest, then there is nothing objectiale aout pragmatically
weighing the public benefit produced by proecting this speech
against the cost to other aspects of the public interest that will
likely be incurred by doing so.
The que ion here thus becomes: What level of immunity best
sti e balance between tie public's interest il full and fair
access to infoIrmation on matiers of pUbliC concernm Olthe one
hand, and its interest that information that Could rea So nabl in flu-
ence conmrs "flow cleanly as well as freel; 3 on the other?
The answer to this question requires difficult emupirical judgments,
as well as a choice between arguably incommensurate values. My
knowledge about the actual ffects of the application of various
levels of free speech immu nit y is quite limited: my practical ex-
perience ith false advertising regulation is even more so. Conse-
quently the following suggestions about the prper level of scru-
tiny are appropriately quilte tenative.
Al things considered, it seems to me that the -malice" stan-
dard offers too much protection to false statements 0 fact for
speech such as is at issue here, and would thus theatn t short-
{ Pphcan o n of" !ess! tha te "malic"' stand ard in Geit: s~ggests th ai the im~muntt! ap-
plied in that case i s whlat is r~eq i red to prote ct t he right o f SPeakers to paricipate in public di S-
cIourse , W I , t Im t sl2 ao i e incu ding propIr in forma-
t{i n flow abount th conduua~ of a{goserment o ffi cials. in'e N.Y. Times (o. ,{ Sulisan,37 6 US.
254 (196 4) (an muci h m iore duiou 6 sly, public dgurces)i Curitis Puhbl' (o s. l : iun 3 8 8 U.S
130 (167) (excendin the "malicei standard to defamaion suits b pulNic tigureS)
'11p;c!s note S-, a"nd accompanying text.
siec da ot 6 r4 am acaoinpa oly ste xt.
(1976)
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change the state's interest in consU me protection. I For one
thing, unlike false statements made by a citizen about a govern-
ment official, the statements niade by a business entit about ts
labor practices relate to facts known to it, or which it can readily
ascertain. Additionally, the immunity offered by the 'malice"
standard is in Practice extremely difficult to defeat.' Finally,
given te enormous financial motivatiOn for busines ses to pers uade
the consu ming public that they maintainl safe and fair working
conditions, Or to peIsuade consumers about any other aspect of
their business that miglt affect sales, application of the malice
standard might remoNe too much of the deterrence inp osed by
false advert i sing regimes like California's . It may well be that
wihout some substantial deterrence, bu sinesses involved in public
controversies that threaten their sales will ble tempted to intention-
ally mislead the public. Thus, California Supreme Cou rt Justice
Brown, though vigoro uslydissenting from the mlanjority's refusal to
afford Nike's speech any First Amendment protection, expressed
concern that -an actual malice standard may be too hi gh ..
On balance, a re linmited First Amendment immunity akin
to that provided under Geri: v. Robert Welch, Inc. seems in or-
der. UInder this standard, a plaintiff cannot reco'ver in a defama-
tion action uless he can show that the defendart was at leastneg
ligent in making the untrue stand in addition, can
prove that he was actua1 y dam aged by these statements) 9  The
prohibition on liability without fault will ameliorate somewhat the
chilli ng e ffect on speech on matters of public Concern imposed by
potent alse advertising regimes such as California's (which may
wel all io mposion of strict liabilit y) °by providing protection
!My as su m ption in th~is pan o 6f th~e art icle that the ( a ibtornia regi me do es n vio 6l at e the
cor~e rioniality. p recp undii er~lyvingthe l Fiist Amienshoient entail thee oncli~on thits~ app0lica-
tiiothis pecha dyane, some leg iimiate interest i S consoe p rotion i nun aioied awit
keepi n g p eo0ple from maXk in g so me un'is politcal{ iede is io n ~l t ernativclyi 1 m ay b e inco0rrec
t!at i  s bud espem' issi ble for (aliform a ply its regimeto speec13,l ta nex tic ab
blends asp ets o cm ercial ! peec ;and pu b lic isoe , eaving the st to re1gua tae thiS
amagamsolon a it does. not? undoly burde: n ilotao needed I ocraidesinak
1' eeg. David A\ logan lb lai in tjh lrenries: ,( iirnit lro lo l e ligo
8 500 (stating ,zibSeq to e Yo lI[-wo em V ol Su1l ir, Ithe aetna
malice standaid wtas claif~tied and rme ,,ers diflitilt to ineef) see a/so W i WAI !!ovds.
!ON t I Q U t I) t LAW ANi 1 li T itU I( ti AI M t1 : i ] Nt C F [I t Yt 1 K1,2 At ti 2 1 1 1 1tilt 1
SiLL fi{ii 8{ (1989) (stati ng th!at pub5l ic figur es cl aim t hey cannt ade quatl prtcherrpt
tio becas m a lice stada rd FiI po s a ne arly impo ssible burden f pf'i )
"Kasky, 4$ Padat 280isseing..
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for innocent nisstatements of ft tat ae lkel to be made by a
large orgmization about is working conditos.
t is, Weer the ban on presumned damnges thatwould likel y
provide even nmore potent proection. As we have seen, the private
atorney general provision, which empowers any itizen to invoke
the heavy artillery of California's false adverti sing laws w ithout
al leging haIt she 0r any other p er son vwas actual l y dec e ived, magn i-
fies thie power of these laws to chil true stateme ntsand to do so in
a viewpoint discriminatory manner. 71 A constitutional require-
m1e nit that, with respect to spee on atter of publi concer any
private plaintiff mlust both allege and prove actual reliance and
damtages wvould reduce the in terrorem effect of thislegal regi me
on speech needed by the public. The abilit of publc olicitals or
.agene. to seek an injunction or even, in an appropriate case, to
require c orrective advertising, should leave tie C alifo rnia law with
sufficient deterrence to adequately protect .onsImers.
The on1 disadvantage of pr)viding immunity less protective
than the "malice" Standard is that, in light of the stronger i mmu n ity
for false stat ements enjoyed by critics of a business' employment
practices the ideological playinzg field will remain uneven,
though less so than if allegedly false or nisleading statements en-
joyed no consti onal immunity. To exten that this greater
immunity is thought necessary to prOtect the participatory rights of
individual citizens, this disparity is a consequence of the basic
constitutional precept that individual citizens, not business entities,
have a righi to denmoratic participation. 7 Inl addition, businesses
criticized fo their Munfair business practices are in a better position
to accurately detrmine the relevant facts than are their adversar-
iecs. F inally), it is, at least arg1uable that thIe po'ssibilIity o F legal sanic-
tions is less likey to deter businesses engaged in defending thei
business piactices than it is t stife the speech f ordinary citlzens
Or eenpo1itical adVOCacy groups. Despitethesemitigating fac-
tors, however, it remains a trou ling posSibiliy that providing
businesses with a lesser degree o f irminity than their critics w ill
somewhat distort the debate on iiportant public policY matters
But this potential Cost seenis preferable to tlh certain emasc u1 ation
5&o esopra notctS3 I 3 '0 a nd aeeinpatn g* text.
,Sec si*pra notcs 138 anid 154 and accompanyin text
Il,!t howeser. as Suggested supro note 16( and accompany ingi txt, the immumty*S needed
to Pnnet ¢SP ea ker participatio n~i in pb!hc diSCOur se is th le ! ser G"eri staaid, this may me a~n
acco0pan aiiing text, is in seri~Ce ot i nstrttmental coniside ratios Oi thsisi so Oit tmay be p reter-
abei to solVe the problem o f th nex eni playinig field by redxuceintg the imnitiy asvadilablert
cri tics of ust'nesscs to the (krtz stanad r at het than a ffordi ng o rdinaiiy buis iness cot'p iat{ (iii s
tite greater "malie" inilylltll3ofii .$ YotrA i hws G:o: a uhr
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of consumer protection that would result if business entities in
Nike's situation were im mu ne from false advertisin g s anctions
unless they intentionally made false statements or did so with con-
sciou s disrega ,rd of' th t Cruth.
In sum, while afording Nike's alle.gedly false or misleading
statements G -like immunity is not a perfet s olution, it seens.
on balance, to be the optimal one.
~CONC L[JSION
Afa mo o10gic problem Supposes a Iaver who comes upon
a person standing at an intersection of two roads. The traveler
knows that down one these roads live peple who tell only the
truth, while down the other live people who tell ony lies. The
traveler also knows that the person standing at the ntersection
lives down one of these two roads, but he does not know which
one. The problem asks what one simple (i.e., not compound) ques-
tion the traveler can ask in order to deteLmine which road the truth
tells le down. What is tricky (and amusing) about this prOblem
is that de spite many people's intuition that the solution requires
figuring out which category truth teller or lie teller the person
standing at the inersection belongs to, attemptring to so cegorize
the person actua I ly districts from findi ng the correct soluion. '
Similarly, formal istically trying to categorize statements standing
at the intersection of ordinary commercial speech and debate on
matters Of public Concern diStracted tihe California Supreme Court
from finding tie correct Solution 0 the problem in this Case. The
proper approac h for a court faed with such a hard case is first to
ask Nwh at free speech values ae implcated by the egulatio of the
speech in question, nid then, based on such a nalyss to catego-
rize the speech in question.
Unlike the traveler in the logic problem, however, we are a l-
lowed to ask more than oneII questo6n. So then, it might bhe asked,
how, in tle final analysi should Nike's statements be catego-
rized? So l0n gas it is re ognized that such cateZg orization is a
Conclusion rather than a substitute for analysis of the free speech
value S implicated by California's false advertising laws, there is no
harm in clasifing the speech. Indeed, te usualy belnleficial for-
malism of free speech doctrine might be ser\ed in doing so. In
any event, if it is true not oy that Nike's speech is an indivisible
nix of speech on maiters Of public concern and C0mmerCial
speech, but also that the decisions influenced by its allegedly false
"1)own which road do you iiv& or~' Iwihich x~ay arc your peopic'~
wall
CAS INLS[JjRN RESER'L [A 14 RITEWV.4
ad misleading statements ae similarly an inseparable blend of
democratic decisionmaking and consumer activity, then I think the
speech should be considered public discourse. If, however this
assumption is incorrect, then I think that Nike's statements are bet-
ter categorized as a highly prot ected form of commercial speech
rather than as a lesser-protected form of public dis course. Specifi-
cally, it is commercial speech, but due to its connection \ ith mat-
ers of pblic concern i is exepted from theusual rule tat i must
be neither false nor misleading in order to be eligible for the lim-
ited First Amendent protection afforded commercial sp eech Put
another way, on the asumpionthat Cliforia egulatoryregime
does not violate some core free speech norm, it is more accurate to
categorize Nike's speech as beefed Up c0mmerCial speech rather
than pared do in public discourse. The category of public dis-
cOur"se should, in my view be reserved for speech that is truly Con-
stitutive of democracy, either because it involes a speaker's right
to participate in the speech by which we govern ourselves, or, even
in the absence of such a Speaker, because the government is re-
stricting in for mation so tie people are not misled into forming
some erroneous beief or mraking an unwise social policy decision.
In coIcIlusion though, I want t0 emphasize that such cate goriza-
tion is but an heuristic that is uisefll, perhaps even essential to a
moaturHe free speech doctine in a complex legal system; that it is a
Conclusion, not an argument; and that in alny difficult free s p eech
cases such abstract categorization cannot substitute for careful
analysis of the free Speech Values implicated by the regulation in
question.
[ \ () 1, 5 4: 4
